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ABSTRACT
In recent years, immigration enforcement levels have soared,
yielding a widely noted increase in the number of noncitizens
removed from the United States. Less visible, however, has been
an attendant sea change in the underlying nature of immigration
governance itself, hastened by new surveillance and
dataveillance technologies. Like many other areas of contemporary governance, immigration control has rapidly become an information-centered and technology-driven enterprise. At virtually
every stage of the process of migrating or traveling to, from, and
within the United States, both noncitizens and U.S. citizens are
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now subject to collection and analysis of extensive quantities of
personal information for immigration control and other purposes.
This information is aggregated and stored by government
agencies for long retention periods in networks of interoperable
databases and shared among a variety of public and private
actors, both inside and outside the United States, with little
transparency, oversight, or accountability.
In this Article, I theorize and assess this underappreciated
transformation of the techniques and technologies of immigration
enforcement—their swift proliferation, enormous scale, likely
entrenchment, and broader meanings.
Situating this
reconfiguration within a larger set of developments concerning
surveillance and technology, I explain how these technologies
have transformed a regime of immigration control, operating
primarily upon noncitizens at the territorial border, into part of a
more expansive regime of migration and mobility surveillance,
operating without geographic bounds upon citizens and
noncitizens alike. The technologies that enable this immigration
surveillance regime can, and do, bring great benefits. However,
their unimpeded expansion erodes the practical mechanisms and
legal principles that have traditionally constrained aggregations
of power and protected individual autonomy, as similarly
illustrated in current debates over surveillance in other settings.
In the immigration context, those constraints have always been
less robust in the first place. Accordingly, I urge more
constrained implementation of these technologies to preserve
zones where immigration surveillance activities do not take place
and to ensure greater due process and accountability when they
do.
A complete understanding of immigration enforcement today
must account for how the evolution of enforcement institutions,
practices, and meanings has not simply increased the number of
noncitizens being deported but has effected a more basic
transformation in immigration governance. The institutions of
immigration surveillance are becoming integrated into the
broader national surveillance state very rapidly. As that
reconfiguration proceeds, scholars, policymakers, advocates, and
community members need to grapple more directly with its
implications.

1/14/2015 12:10 PM

2014]

IMMIGRATION SURVEILLANCE

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................. 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................ 3
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 4
I. THE TRANSFORMATION OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ................ 10
A. Monitoring and Regulating Entry........................................... 12
B. Direct Post-Entry Monitoring and Enforcement..................... 17
C. Indirect Post-Entry Monitoring and Enforcement .................. 23
D. Criminal Prosecution of Migration-Related Offenses ............ 25
E. Exit Controls ........................................................................... 26
II. THE NEW SURVEILLANCE INFRASTRUCTURE OF MASS
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ..................................................... 27
A. The Functions and Practices of Immigration Surveillance..... 28
1. Identification .................................................................... 28
2. Analysis, Screening, and Authorization........................... 32
3. Mobility Tracking and Control ........................................ 36
4. Information Sharing and Interoperability ........................ 39
B. Immigration Enforcement as Immigration Surveillance ........ 41
1. Border Control ................................................................. 41
2. Overseas Visa Issuance and Refugee Processing ............ 42
3. Entry, Exit, and Travel Control........................................ 44
4. Post-Entry Enforcement ................................................... 47
III. LEGALIZATION AND THE IMMIGRATION SURVEILLANCE STATE ...... 54
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION SURVEILLANCE ................. 58
A. Deterritorializing the Migration Border ................................. 58
B. Automating the Migration Border .......................................... 64
C. Data Collection, Retention, and Secondary Use..................... 69
V. CONSTRAINING THE IMMIGRATION SURVEILLANCE STATE .............. 72
A. Protecting Information Interests in Migration, Mobility,
and Travel............................................................................... 73
B. Ending Border and Immigration Exceptionalism ................... 74
C. Transparency, Oversight, and Due Process ............................ 75
VI. CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 78

3

4

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 74:1

INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the politics of immigration have been in a state of
considerable flux. Although only months before the 2012 election the
Republican Party and its presidential nominee officially embraced policies
aimed at inducing large-scale “self-deportation” by unauthorized migrants,
in the wake of the election leading Republicans exhibited a widely noted
change of heart, facilitating the Senate’s bipartisan adoption of sweeping
comprehensive immigration reform legislation.1 Since then, legislative
reform efforts in Congress have stalled, leaving the prospects for significant
immigration reform legislation deeply uncertain.
However, even if Congress eventually embraces comprehensive
immigration reform, the sprawling immigration enforcement system that
has emerged in recent decades appears certain not just to endure, but to
extend its reach. The reform frameworks advanced by the Obama
Administration and leading members of Congress, while committing to
legalize millions of unauthorized migrants, all pledge major expansions in
border security and immigration control. 2 Although the particular forms of
regulation remain in flux, any reforms that occur undoubtedly will include
an aggressive, continuing commitment to large-scale enforcement
measures. 3
In this Article, I examine a set of important but underappreciated
consequences of this entrenchment of mass immigration enforcement,
tracing and analyzing the evolution of immigration governance into an
enduring regime of immigration surveillance. 4
By any measure,
1. Ryan Lizza, Getting to Maybe: Inside the Gang of Eight’s Immigration Deal, NEW
YORKER, Jun. 24, 2013, at 44; see Anil Kalhan, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Implications
of Interior Immigration Enforcement, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1137, 1165–67 (2008) (discussing
“self-deportation”).
2. Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744,
113th Cong. (as passed by Senate, June 27, 2013); Fact Sheet: Fixing Our Broken Immigration
System So Everyone Plays by the Rules, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 29, 2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/29/fact-sheet-fixing-our-brokenimmigration-system-so-everyone-plays-rules; Text of Republicans’ Principles on Immigration,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1a4AeTh.
3. See, e.g., Marco Rubio, Mis Principios Para Una Reforma Migratoria, LA OPINIÓN (Jan.
23, 2013), http://www.laopinion.com/marco-rubio-principios-reforma-migratoria (advocating enforcement “triggers” as precondition to legalization of unauthorized migrants); Seth Freed Wessler, How Immigration Reform Could Expand Incarceration of Immigrants, COLORLINES (Feb. 6,
2013),
http://colorlines.com/archives/2013/02/how_immigration_reform_could_mean_more_incarceratio
n_of_immigrants.html; see also David A. Martin, Eight Myths About Immigration Enforcement,
10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 525, 526 (2007) (advocating a “stable, enduring, and functional
enforcement system” as an “indispensable component of viable immigration reform”).
4. JOHN GILLIOM & TORIN MONAHAN, SUPERVISION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 2 (2013) (defining surveillance as involving “systematic monitoring,
gathering, and analysis of information in order to make decisions, minimize risk, sort populations,
and exercise power”); DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW 14 (2007); Jack M.
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enforcement levels have soared in recent years. Federal expenditures on
border and immigration control have grown fifteen-fold since 1986 and
now substantially exceed expenditures on all other federal law enforcement
programs combined. 5 These activities have been supplemented by a
dizzying array of initiatives, often administered by state, local, and private
actors, that indirectly enforce immigration law by regulating access to
rights, benefits, and services—including employment, social services,
driver’s licenses, transportation services, and education—based on
citizenship or immigration status. 6 Increasingly, immigration control
objectives also are pursued using criminal prosecutions. 7
These initiatives have yielded a staggering, widely noted increase in
the number of noncitizens formally removed from the United States.8
Much less widely noted, however, has been the full significance of that
growth—including an attendant sea change in the underlying nature of
immigration regulation itself, hastened by the implementation of
Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2008); Gary T.
Marx, What’s New About the “New Surveillance”? Classifying for Change and Continuity, 1
SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 9, 18 (2002).
5. DORIS MEISSNER, DONALD M. KERWIN, MUZAFFAR CHISHTI & CLAIRE BERGERON,
MIGRATION POL’Y INST., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: THE RISE OF A
FORMIDABLE MACHINERY (2013). The federal judiciary has also devoted a growing share of its
resources to adjudicating immigration enforcement cases. ABA COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION,
REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS,
EFFICIENCY, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES 1-33 & n.242,
3-21 to 3-26 (2010).
6. Monica Varsanyi, Immigration Policy Activism in U.S. States and Cities: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, in TAKING LOCAL CONTROL: IMMIGRATION POLICY ACTIVISM IN U.S. CITIES
AND STATES 1, 3 (Monica Varsanyi ed., 2010); Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment
of Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193 (2007); see
Kalhan, supra note 1, at 1158–60 (conceptualizing the distinction between direct and indirect enforcement mechanisms).
7. Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR
135 (2009); Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281 (2010); David
Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157 (2012).
8. MARC R. ROSENBLUM, DORIS MEISSNER, CLAIRE BERGERON & FAYE HIPSMAN,
MIGRATION POL’Y INST., THE DEPORTATION DILEMMA: RECONCILING TOUGH AND HUMANE
ENFORCEMENT 3–6 (2014); Developments in the Law—Immigrants Rights & Immigration Enforcement, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1565, 1569–70 (2013); The Great Expulsion, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8,
2014, at 23; Adam Goodman, How the Deportation Numbers Mislead, AL JAZEERA AM. (Jan. 24,
2014), http://alj.am/1avrZQT. From 1986 to 2012, the annual number of formal removals skyrocketed from approximately 25,000 to over 419,000 individuals. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
OFFICE OF IMMIGR. STATS., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2012 (2013). Hundreds of
thousands of noncitizens are detained each year while in removal proceedings or awaiting removal. Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 44–45
(2010). Federal convictions for migration-related crimes have also spiraled upward, from approximately 9,000 in 1986 to over 27,000 by 2010. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, IMMIGRATION OFFENDERS IN THE FEDERAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 2010 (2012). While
more uneven, workplace enforcement of laws barring employment of unauthorized workers also
has increased. ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IMMIGRATION-RELATED WORKSITE
ENFORCEMENT: PERFORMANCE MEASURES 5–13 (2012).

6

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 74:1

transformative new surveillance and dataveillance technologies. Like many
other areas of contemporary governance, immigration control has rapidly
become an information-centered and technology-driven enterprise. At
virtually every stage of the process of migrating or traveling to, from, and
within the United States, both noncitizens and U.S. citizens are now subject
to collection and analysis of extensive quantities of personal information for
immigration control and other purposes. This information is aggregated
and stored by government agencies for long retention periods in networks
of interoperable databases and shared among a variety of public and private
actors, both inside and outside the United States, with little transparency,
oversight, or accountability. 9
Despite the growing concern about surveillance and data mining in
other contexts, the development of this immigration surveillance regime has
received limited attention. 10 Although a rich literature assesses shifts in
immigration law in recent decades, the transformation of enforcement
practices themselves—understood as a conceptual and programmatic whole,
rather than a series of discrete programs—remains insufficiently
examined. 11 When analyzing enforcement in systemic terms, scholars have
emphasized other important concerns, such as the meaning and significance
of deportation and unlawful presence.12 Observers have carefully examined
immigration law’s adjudicatory processes and its convergence with criminal

9. MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 66 (“Database screening now accompanies virtually
all key interactions between noncitizens and the federal government.”); Anil Kalhan, Immigration
Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and Privacy, 74 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1105 (2013); Valsamis Mitsilegas, Extraterritorial Immigration Control in the 21st Century:
The Individual and the State Transformed, in EXTRATERRITORIAL IMMIGRATION CONTROL:
LEGAL CHALLENGES 39, 39 (Bernard Ryan & Valsamis Mitsilegas eds., 2010); Tamara Vukov &
Mimi Sheller, Border Work: Surveillant Assemblages, Virtual Fences, and Tactical CounterMedia, 23 SOC. SEMIOTICS 225 (2013).
10. MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 65 (noting that these technologies have been “transformational” but “ha[ve] not received the attention given to more visible changes”).
11. See Hiroshi Motomura, Choosing Immigrants, Making Citizens, 59 STAN. L. REV. 857,
870 (2007) (emphasizing the need to “think systematically about . . . immigration law choices”);
Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Integrated Regime of Immigration Regulation, in WRITING
IMMIGRATION: SCHOLARS AND JOURNALISTS IN DIALOGUE 44 (Marcelo Suárez-Orozco, Vivian
Louie, & Roberto Suro eds., 2011) (urging integrated analysis of the “federal-state-local dynamic
in immigration regulation” as a coherent whole); Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, The Political Economies of Immigration Law, 2 UC IRVINE L. REV. 1 (2012) (highlighting broad areas of convergence among seemingly disparate immigration-related issues).
12. See, e.g., BILL ONG HING, DEPORTING OUR SOULS: VALUES, MORALITY, AND
IMMIGRATION POLICY (2006); DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION LAW AND THE
NEW AMERICAN DIASPORA (2012); HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW
(2014); Stephen Legomsky, Immigration Policy from Scratch: The Universal and the Unique, 21
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 339 (2012); Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1715, 1735–39 (2006); Michael J. Wishnie, Proportionality: The Struggle for Balance in
U.S. Immigration Policy, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 431 (2011).
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law norms and practices. 13 Scholars also have addressed the significance of
race, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, and class in
enforcement practices.14
And a growing body of work explores
immigration federalism and localism. 15
However, legal scholars have given virtually no attention to the
revolution taking place in the techniques and technologies of immigration
enforcement themselves—their swift proliferation, enormous scale, likely
entrenchment, and broader meanings. In this Article, I theorize and assess
these shifts, situating and analyzing them within a broader, longer term set
of developments concerning technology and surveillance in contemporary
governance. 16 Immigration control has not simply evolved into a system to
effectuate the removal of noncitizens on a massive scale, although it
manifestly has done that. More fundamentally, the evolution of this system
has reshaped the meanings and functions of immigration governance itself,

13. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 613 (2012); Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 595 (2009); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law:
Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007); Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship and Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611 (2003); Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936 (2000); Juliet P.
Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV.
367 (2006).
14. E.g., Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law
After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
295 (2002); Raquel Aldana, Of Katz and “Aliens”: Privacy Expectations and the Immigration
Raids, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081 (2008); Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1543 (2011); Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Citizenship Talk: Bridging the Gap Between Immigration and Race Perspectives, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2493 (2007); Kevin R. Johnson, The Intersection of Race and Class in U.S. Immigration
Law and Enforcement, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2009); Jayashri Srikantiah, Perfect Victims and Real Survivors: The Iconic Victim in Domestic Human Trafficking Law, 87 B.U. L. REV.
157 (2007); SHARITA GRUBERG, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, DIGNITY DENIED: LGBT
IMMIGRANTS IN U.S. IMMIGRATION DETENTION (2013).
15. E.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, The Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 577 (2012); Stella Burch Elias, The New Immigration Federalism, 74 OHIO
ST. L.J. 703 (2013); Lucas Guttentag, Discrimination, Preemption, and Arizona’s Immigration
Law: A Broader View, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2012); Clare Huntington, The Constitutional
Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787 (2008); Anil Kalhan, Immigration
Enforcement and Federalism After September 11, 2001, in IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION, AND
SECURITY: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia
& Simon Reich eds., 2008); Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819
(2011); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106
MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008); Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 57 (2007).
16. See GILLIOM & MONAHAN, supra note 4; Balkin, supra note 4; Marx, supra note 4; see
also Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 101, 106 (2008) (discussing implications
of the emergence of “nonphysical, technology-based means of control,” such as location tracking,
biometric scanning, and electronic indexing, in criminal justice processes).
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transforming a regime of immigration control, operating primarily upon
noncitizens at the border, into part of a more expansive regime of migration
and mobility surveillance, operating without geographic bounds upon
citizens and noncitizens alike. 17 Traditional immigration law frameworks
offer neither the vocabulary to fully engage with this transformation nor the
mechanisms to constrain these surveillance activities across the many
domains in which they occur. Accordingly, I advance a framework to
understand and respond to these developments rooted in scholarship on
surveillance and privacy, bridging a larger divide identified by Vicki Squire
between scholarship on the law and politics of “control” and scholarship on
the law and politics of “migration or movement.” 18
After recounting and interpreting the immigration enforcement
system’s rapid expansion and reconfiguration in Part I, I demonstrate in
Part II how new technologies have reconfigured approaches to four distinct
sets of immigration surveillance practices: identification, screening and
authorization, mobility tracking and control, and information sharing.
These systems and processes routinize the collection, storage, aggregation,
processing, and dissemination of detailed personal information for
immigration control and other purposes on an unprecedented scale and
facilitate the involvement of an escalating number of federal, state, local,
private, and non-U.S. actors in immigration control activities. In Part III, I
explain why the legalization provisions in comprehensive immigration
reform proposals would only make this emergent surveillance regime more
durable and pervasive, since the logic of surveillance—and of making
unauthorized migrants legible and visible to the state—is embedded within
those legalization proposals themselves. This consistency between the
rationales for legalization and immigration surveillance also can be seen in
the Obama Administration’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(“DACA”) program, which illustrates on a smaller scale what immigration
surveillance could look like in the context of any large scale legalization
program that Congress might choose to adopt.
In the remainder of the Article, I consider the implications of this
reordering. In Part IV, I situate immigration surveillance within broader
developments concerning technology, surveillance, and privacy, analyzing
17. Cf. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 168 (2001) (explaining the process by which the “institutional architecture” and “state apparatus” of criminal justice have remained “firmly in place,” but have been
transformed in their “deployment, strategic functioning, and social significance”); SASKIA
SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES 1, 403
(2006) (discussing “micro-processes” of globalization that “begin to denationalize what had been
constructed as national”).
18. Vicki Squire, The Contested Politics of Mobility in THE CONTESTED POLITICS OF
MOBILITY: BORDERZONES AND IRREGULARITY 1, 3–4 (Vicki Squire ed. 2011); see Murphy, supra note 16 (bridging the analogous divide between scholarship on criminal incapacitation and
scholarship on privacy and surveillance).
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the consequences of routinized and widening collection, processing,
retention, and dissemination of detailed personal information for
immigration control purposes. As these immigration surveillance activities
have proliferated, what I term the migration border—the set of boundary
points at which nation-states authorize individuals to enter or be admitted,
prevent or allow their entry or admission, or subject them to possible
expulsion—has been decoupled from the territorial border and rendered
“virtual”: layered, electronic, mobile, and policed by an escalating number
of public and private actors. In the process, the lines between immigration
control and other regulatory domains have blurred.
The technologies that enable immigration surveillance are not
inherently harmful; indeed, many of them can and do bring significant
benefits. However, their unconstrained implementation also carries several
categories of underappreciated costs—all of which are exacerbated by the
extent of deference afforded in the context of immigration enforcement,
border control, and national security. Accordingly, in Part V, I identify and
advance principles to constrain, inform, and guide the implementation of
these tools of the “automated administrative state.”19 As illustrated in
current debates over surveillance and data mining by the National Security
Agency and other institutions, both public and private, the unimpeded
expansion of surveillance and dataveillance mechanisms erodes both the
legal principles and the practical mechanisms that have traditionally
constrained aggregations of public and private power and protected
individual autonomy and privacy. 20 In the immigration context, those
constraints have always been less robust than in many other regulatory
domains. Drawing upon surveillance and privacy scholarship, I urge more
constrained implementation of these powerful technologies, with greater
transparency and oversight, to preserve zones where immigration
surveillance activities do not take place and to ensure greater due process
and accountability when they do.
A complete understanding of immigration regulation today must
account for how the evolution of enforcement institutions, practices, and
meanings has not simply increased the number of noncitizens being
deported, but has effected a more basic transformation in immigration
governance, in a manner that experiences outside the immigration context
similarly illustrate. 21 Nor is the onset of the immigration surveillance state
19. Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1258
(2008); see also Kalhan, supra note 9.
20. GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND THE U.S.
SURVEILLANCE STATE (2014); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF EVERYTHING
(AND WHY WE SHOULD WORRY) (2011); Alice E. Marwick, How Your Data Are Being Deeply
Mined, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 9, 2014, at 22.
21. GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 208 (1988) (“Computers qualitatively alter the nature of surveillance—routinizing, broadening, and deepening it”);
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solely of concern to immigration specialists, especially since experience
shows that innovations in surveillance techniques and technologies often
are initiated with groups that are vulnerable or subject to heightened
control—including noncitizens—before later going mainstream. 22 As the
institutions of immigration surveillance rapidly become integrated into the
broader national surveillance state, the need to squarely address the
consequences of that reconfiguration becomes more acute.23
I. THE TRANSFORMATION OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
Before assessing the shifts currently taking place in the nature of
immigration governance with the implementation of new technologies, it is
necessary to first understand the development and proliferation of the
immigration enforcement activities into which these new systems are being
deployed. While regularized enforcement programs were limited for much
of U.S. history and have tended to emphasize control of the territorial
border with Mexico, in recent decades immigration monitoring and control
initiatives have grown explosively across a much broader range of
domains. 24 In this Part, to establish the context for the technology-enabled
Bernard E. Harcourt, After the “Social Meaning Turn”: Implications for Research Design and
Methods of Proof in Contemporary Criminal Law Policy Analysis, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 179,
182 (2000) (arguing that curfew laws and order maintenance policing not only “influence . . .
short-term behavior” as intended but also “reconfigure” and “more deeply affect our very understanding of order or disorder” and “shape us as contemporary subjects of society”); MARIANOFLORENTINO CUÉLLAR, GOVERNING SECURITY: THE HIDDEN ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SECURITY
AGENCIES xi–xii (2013) (arguing that interplay between “architecture of public agencies . . . political strategies, and legal interpretations” has “shaped public perceptions of [national] security” and
“given life” to its meaning); GARLAND, supra note 17, at 194 (arguing that crime control strategies have not simply been responses to “political and cultural values” of “the late modern world,”
but have “play[ed] a role in creating that world, helping to constitute the meaning of late modernity”); DIANE RAVITCH, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM (2010)
(arguing that emphasis on accountability and testing in education reform has reshaped the nature
and meaning of education itself).
22. SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL
IDENTIFICATION 119–20 (2001) (explaining that late 19th century innovations in fingerprint identification were “stimulated by a perceived need to identify ‘faceless,’ racially unfamiliar” recent
immigrants); GILLIOM & MONAHAN, supra note 4, at 73 (describing schools, prisons, and military
institutions as “laboratories for new surveillance practices” in which “innovations in surveillance
technology are first deployed”); Virginia Eubanks, Want to Predict the Future of Surveillance?
Ask Poor Communities, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 15, 2014), http://prospect.org/article/want-predictfuture-surveillance-ask-poor-communities; see David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953,
959 (2002) (“[W]hat we are willing to allow our government to do to immigrants creates precedents for how it treats citizens.”).
23. Balkin, supra note 4; Gus Hosein, Defining the Surveillance State, PRIVACY INT’L (Oct.
31, 2013), http://www.privacyinternational.org/blog/defining-the-surveillance-state; see also
GILLIOM & MONAHAN, supra note 4, at 45 (describing the process by which “all significant institutions are implementing similar models of governance” that “use[] identification, visibility, and
surveillance as [their] central strategies”).
24. PETER ANDREAS, BORDER GAMES: POLICING THE U.S.-MEXICO DIVIDE 88 (2000); BILL
ONG HING, DEFINING AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY 115 (2004); DANIEL
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shifts that I examine in this Article, I recount this transformation, which
spans every stage of the migration process: before individuals travel to the
United States, during their travel and when they seek to enter, while they
are present, and when they depart. I identify and discuss major shifts in the
modalities and priorities of enforcement across five categories: (1)
initiatives that monitor and regulate entry into the United States, (2) postentry initiatives that directly monitor and regulate noncitizens, (3) postentry initiatives that indirectly monitor and regulate noncitizens, (4)
criminal prosecutions, and (5) initiatives that monitor and regulate
departures from the United States.
Importantly, while these programs have been initiated and
implemented as immigration control measures, many of these measures
necessarily operate upon and are experienced by both noncitizens and U.S.
citizens alike. 25 Increasingly, many of these initiatives also are being
deployed to serve a range of other, non-immigration-related purposes. For
example, especially in the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks and the
creation of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), immigration
enforcement activities have increasingly been cast with security-related
significance. 26 In 2003, the immigration-related functions formerly
performed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”), within
the Department of Justice, were transferred to three new agencies with
DHS: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (“USCIS”), and U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”)—all of which are charged to approach immigration
governance first and foremost through the lens of security. 27 Paradoxically,
even as it has significantly intensified immigration enforcement activities,
the United States has continued to encourage expanded migration flows
while simultaneously seeking to control the nature and patterns of those
flows. As a result, the expansion of immigration enforcement measures
discussed in this Part has operated not only to facilitate the expulsion of
potentially removable noncitizens, as discussions of immigration
enforcement usually emphasize, but also to enable additional forms of
KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 2, 6 (2007) (characterizing the deportation system as having grown “slowly, incrementally, and reactively” from “decentralized” and “inefficient” beginnings); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, JORGE DURAND & NOLAN J.
MALONE, BEYOND SMOKE AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION 26 (2003) (describing early border control efforts as “more symbolic than real”);
MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS & THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA
(2004); Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993).
25. Kalhan, supra note 1, at 1149.
26. CUÉLLAR, supra note 21, at 125–89.
27. See MICHELLE MITTELSTADT, BURKE SPEAKER, DORIS MEISSNER & MUZAFFAR
CHISHTI, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., THROUGH THE PRISM OF NATIONAL SECURITY: MAJOR
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND PROGRAM CHANGES IN THE DECADE SINCE 9/11 (2011).
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regulation, control, and exclusion that are experienced by both noncitizens
and citizens. 28
A. Monitoring and Regulating Entry
Historically, territorial borders and their functional equivalents have
been the focal points of immigration control, and as immigration
enforcement activities have expanded in recent decades, the federal
government has continued to invest heavily in border control and other
measures to control entry into the United States. Among these measures,
the most visible initiative involves the quasi-militarized fortification of the
U.S.-Mexico land border. 29 CBP’s Border Patrol, which totaled a few
thousand agents in the early 1990s, has doubled since 2004 to over 21,000
agents, with the vast majority posted along the southwestern border.30 In
addition, congressional mandates have prompted the construction of over
650 miles of fencing and other physical barriers. 31 Current immigration
reform proposals would go dramatically further, doubling both the number
of Border Patrol agents and the extent of fencing and physical barriers. 32

28. See PHILIP KRETSEDEMAS, MIGRANTS AND RACE IN THE US: TERRITORIAL RACISM AND
ALIEN OUTSIDE 39, 122 (2013) (observing that the “practical effect” of expanded immigration enforcement “has been to control an expanding migrant flow and not to reduce the number of
migrants entering the nation”); Philip Kretsedemas, The Limits of Control: Neo-Liberal Policy
Priorities and the U.S. Non-Immigrant Flow, 50 INT’L MIGRATION e1, e1 (2012) (analyzing the
relationship between the “apparently divergent trends” of “liberalization of migrant flows,” on the
one hand, and “the intensification of immigration enforcement,” on the other); see also KUNAL M.
PARKER, IMMIGRANTS AND OTHER FOREIGNERS IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP LAW (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 4) (explaining and documenting the ways in
which U.S. immigration and citizenship law historically has encompassed “efforts to render [individuals] foreign that have applied to insiders and outsiders, neighbors and strangers,” including
U.S. citizens and noncitizens alike).
29. ANDREAS, supra note 24, at 85–112; MASSEY ET AL., supra note 24, at 96–98.
30. MARC R. ROSENBLUM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BORDER SECURITY: IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT BETWEEN PORTS OF ENTRY 14–15 (2013). The Obama Administration also has
deployed approximately 1,200 National Guard personnel to support the Border Patrol along the
southwestern border. MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 25–26.
31. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 § 564, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 2090,
2090–91 (2007); Secure Fence Act of 2006 § 3, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638, 2638–39
(2006); REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 302, 302–23 (2005); Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 102(a)–(c), Pub. L. No. 104208, 110 Stat. 554, 554–55 (1996); see MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 30–31; Denise Gilman,
Seeking Breaches in the Wall: An International Human Rights Law Challenge to the TexasMexico Border Wall, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 257, 258 (2011); Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Why a Wall?,
2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 147, 151 (2012).
32. Border Security, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744,
113th Cong. §§ 1101–1123 (as passed by Senate, June 27, 2013); see also Fact Sheet, Emergency
Supplemental Request to Address the Increase in Child and Adult Migration from Central America in the Rio Grande Valley Areas of the Southwest Border, WHITE HOUSE (July 8, 2014),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/07/08/fact-sheet-emergency-supplementalrequest-address-increase-child-and-adu.
THE
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Regulation of the U.S.-Canada border, by contrast, has historically
been more limited, but since 2001, security-driven anxieties have effected a
shift toward what Peter Andreas describes as the “Mexicanization” of the
northern border. 33 The number of Border Patrol agents posted along the
U.S.-Canada border has increased from a few hundred in the 1990s to over
2,200 today. 34 Since 2001, the United States, Canada, and Mexico have
coordinated other enforcement practices. Border enforcement teams and
security task forces have been established with both Canada and Mexico to
coordinate investigations and other activities, and plans exist to expand this
cooperation. 35 The United States and Canada also have entered into a “safe
third country” agreement that largely bars refugee claimants arriving in one
country from seeking protection in the other.36
However, officials have gone well beyond these North Americaspecific initiatives, taking aggressive steps to regulate and monitor lawful
entry into the United States more generally. These initiatives build on
mechanisms that have long existed. For noncitizens, Congress has long
required immigrant or nonimmigrant visas, with limited exceptions, before
entering the United States and has established grounds of inadmissibility or
excludability to screen out noncitizens deemed to raise public safety, public
health, national security, and other social concerns.37 While U.S. citizens
are generally assumed to have a right to enter the United States—and at
times have been subject to very minimal scrutiny when entering—U.S.
officials have nevertheless historically exercised control over international
travel by U.S. citizens, including their entry in the United States, through

33. Peter Andreas, The Mexicanization of the US-Canada Border: Asymmetric Interdependence in a Changing Security Context, 60 INT’L J. 449 (2005); Audrey Macklin, Disappearing Refugees: Reflections on the Canada-U.S. Safe Third Country Agreement, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 365, 411 (2005).
34. MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 18, 38–39; Nina Bernstein, Border Sweeps in North
Reach Miles into U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2010, at A1.
35. Canada-U.S. Smart Border Declaration: Building a Smart Border for the 21st Century on
the Foundation of a North American Zone of Confidence, Dec. 12, 2001; U.S.-Canada Beyond the
Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness, Dec. 2011; see
CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE & KRISTIN M. FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S.-MEXICAN
SECURITY COOPERATION: THE MÉRIDA INITIATIVE AND BEYOND (2013); Sigrid Arzt, U.S.Mexico Security Collaboration: Intelligence Sharing and Law Enforcement Cooperation, in
SHARED RESPONSIBILITY: U.S.-MEXICO POLICY OPTIONS FOR CONFRONTING ORGANIZED CRIME
351 (Eric L. Olson, David A. Shirk & Andrew D. Selee eds., 2010); Kent Roach, Uneasy Neighbors: Comparative American and Canadian Counter-Terrorism, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1701, 1790–94 (2012).
36. Safe Third Country Agreement, Can.-U.S., Dec. 5, 2002; Efrat Arbel, Shifting Borders
and the Boundaries of Rights: Examining the Safe Third Country Agreement Between Canada and
the United States, 25 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 65 (2013).
37. IRA J. KURZBAN, IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 41–98 (13th ed. 2012). Under the
Immigration and Nationality Act, a “nonimmigrant” is a noncitizen who falls within one of a variety of statutorily defined categories of non-permanent entrants to the United States. The statute
defines all other noncitizens as “immigrants.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2013).
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the issuance, recognition, and revocation of U.S. passports and by other
regulatory means. 38 Procedurally, when seeking to enter the United States,
both noncitizens and U.S. citizens have traditionally been subject at the
border to questioning and “routine” suspicionless searches and seizures,
which the Supreme Court has deemed to be per se reasonable when
conducted for purposes of enforcing immigration and customs laws—and
therefore exempt from the Fourth Amendment’s warrant and probable cause
requirements—“simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border.”39
In recent years, however, efforts to control entry have extended well
beyond traditional means of excluding noncitizens, regulating U.S. citizen
travel, and conducting ordinary searches and seizures at the border, as both
noncitizens and U.S. citizens have been subject to more intensive scrutiny
at every stage of the process of migrating or traveling to the United States.
Most of these new initiatives have roots in immigration policy debates that
predate the 2001 terrorist attacks. For example, in the 1980s and 1990s,
Congress steadily expanded the grounds upon which noncitizens may be
barred from entry or admission and curtailed the opportunities for those
grounds to be waived. 40 But as with the Canada-specific initiatives
discussed above, efforts to tighten control over entry since 2001
increasingly have been justified with reference to national security and
criminal law enforcement, and have emphasized the collection, storage,
processing, and sharing of detailed personal information about all
prospective entrants. 41
First, before even seeking to enter the United States, noncitizens are
scrutinized more closely than ever before when applying for visas.
Although the State Department plays the primary role in processing visa
applications, Congress has authorized DHS to assign its own personnel to
diplomatic posts to advise and train consular officers, conduct
investigations, and review consular decisions. Congress has mandated in38. Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 67 (2001) (describing U.S.
citizenship as conferring an “absolute right to enter its borders”); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
TRANSPORTATION: EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RECEPTION OF FOREIGN VISITORS AT U.S. AIRPORTS
5–6 (1991); Jeffrey Kahn, The Extraordinary Mrs. Shipley: How the United States Controlled International Travel Before the Age of Terrorism, 43 CONN. L. REV. 819 (2011).
39. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977); see Kalhan, supra note 1, at 1189–
97; Immigration Inspections When Arriving in the U.S., TRAC IMMIGRATION (Apr. 4, 2006),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/142. While “non-routine” searches or seizures at the border must be justified by reasonable suspicion, courts have established a high threshold to deem
searches or seizures non-routine, and the Supreme Court has applied a lower standard for nonroutine border searches and seizures than the probable cause standard that ordinarily applies inside
the country. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 551 (1985).
40. See Nancy Morawetz, The Invisible Border: Restrictions on Short-Term Travel by
Noncitizens, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 201 (2007) [hereinafter Morawetz, Invisible Border]; Nancy
Morawetz, Rethinking Drug Inadmissibility, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 163 (2008).
41. See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 416–19 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMM’N REPORT].
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person interviews for most nonimmigrant visa applicants, who are also
subject to more intensive background checks. 42
Moreover, while
noncitizens from countries designated under the Visa Waiver Program have
been permitted since 1986 to enter the United States without visas as shortterm visitors, Congress and DHS more recently have mandated these
individuals to apply online for advance “authorization” to enter before
commencing their travel.43 Noncitizens admitted to the United States as
refugees are also now subject to detailed and lengthy background checks. 44
Second, both noncitizens and U.S. citizens face increased scrutiny
during their travel to the United States. International carriers have long
been required to ensure that their passengers are legally authorized to enter
the United States and may be held liable for failure to do so. 45 Beginning in
1988, at the request of U.S. officials, many carriers voluntarily began to
transmit personal information collected prior to departure from passengers
and other sources to U.S. officials while en route to the United States in
order to facilitate efficient customs and immigration screening upon
arrival. 46 In the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress and DHS
mandated all commercial airlines and sea carriers to transmit this
information to U.S. officials prior to departure, both to facilitate customs
and immigration screening and to assess potential risks posed by both
noncitizen and U.S. citizen travelers.47 In addition, although formal
inspection and admission of travelers ordinarily takes place upon arrival at
official U.S. ports of entry, individuals traveling from some countries are
42. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118
Stat. 3638 (2004); Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 428, Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 287 (2002);
KEVIN R. JOHNSON, RAQUEL E. ALDANA, BILL ONG HING, LETICIA SAUCEDO, & ENID TRUCIOSHAYNES, UNDERSTANDING IMMIGRATION LAW 287–95 (2009).
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1187 (2013); Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007 § 711, Pub. L. 110-53, 121 Stat. 338 (2007); Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-173, 116 Stat. 543 (2002); A. James Vazquez-Azpiri & Daniel C.
Horne, The Doorkeeper of Homeland Security: Proposals for the Visa Waiver Program, 16 STAN.
L. & POL’Y REV. 513, 524–28 (2005).
44. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, THE EFFECTS OF NEW UNITED STATES SECURITY
SCREENING MEASURES FOR REFUGEES (2012).
45. Janet A. Gilboy, Implications of “Third-Party” Involvement in Enforcement: The INS,
Illegal Travelers, and International Airlines, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 505 (1997).
46. EDWARD ALDEN, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN BORDER: TERRORISM,
IMMIGRATION, AND SECURITY SINCE 9/11, at 28–32 (2009); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
supra note 38, at 5–6.
47. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 § 4012, Pub. L. No. 108-458,
118 Stat. 3714 (2004); Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act § 402, Pub. L. No.
107-153, 116 Stat. 543 (2002); Aviation and Transportation Security Act § 115(c), Pub. L. No.
107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001); see infra Part II.B.3. Noncitizen travelers are inadmissible if they
decline to provide this advance passenger information to carriers, and U.S. citizens who decline to
provide this information may be prohibited from traveling by the carrier or subjected to greater
scrutiny upon arrival in the United States. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY OFFICE,
PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE ADVANCE PASSENGER INFORMATION SYSTEM (APIS)
(2007).
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subject to “preinspection” before they commence their travel by U.S.
officials posted extraterritorially at ports of embarkation.48 Since 2004,
DHS also has posted “advisory personnel” in several countries to help
airline employees and airport officials review travel documents and screen
travelers for security and public safety risks on U.S.-bound flights, and in
some instances to make recommendations that airlines not board particular
travelers. 49
Finally, both citizens and noncitizens are now scrutinized more closely
when they arrive and seek to enter the United States. Over 400 million
noncitizens and U.S. citizens lawfully enter the United States at official
ports of entry each year—with approximately one-quarter of them arriving
by air—and border inspectors now conduct more intensive scrutiny to
determine their admissibility and any risks they might present. 50 Congress
has conferred inspectors with wide latitude to use a streamlined mechanism,
expedited removal, to turn away noncitizens deemed inadmissible on
specified grounds upon their arrival without further adjudication.51 U.S.
officials also have been more assertive in restricting international travel by
U.S. citizens, including their entry into the United States—for example, by
confiscating or revoking their passports while abroad, prohibiting travel by
air or sea, or creating other obstacles to entry. 52 In addition, both
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (2013); U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, FACT SHEET:
PRECLEARANCE
OPERATIONS
1
(May
2013),
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/preclearance_factsheet_2.pdf; Harry Hiller, Airports as Borderlands: American Preclearance and Transitional Spaces in Canada, 25 J.
BORDERLANDS STUD. 19, 21–27 (2010).
49. While these U.S. officials lack authority to prohibit individuals from traveling to the
United States, airlines generally comply with their no-board recommendations, given the risk of
being denied landing and the potential sanctions they might face if individuals are refused admission upon arrival. U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, FACT SHEET: IMMIGRATION
ADVISORY
PROGRAM
(IAP)
(May
2013),
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/immig_advis_prog_2.pdf; see also LISA
SEGHETTI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BORDER SECURITY: IMMIGRATION INSPECTIONS AT PORT
OF ENTRY 10 (2014).
50. MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 57–58.
51. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I); see Lisa J. LaPlante, Expedited Removal at U.S. Borders: A World Without a Constitution, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 213 (1999); Jaya Ramji, Legislating Away International Law: The Refugee Provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 37 STAN. J. INT’L L. 117 (2001).
52. Jeffrey Kahn, International Travel and the Constitution, 56 UCLA L. REV. 271 (2008);
Leti Volpp, Citizenship Undone, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2579 (2007); Amel Ahmed, YemeniAmericans Cry Foul over Passport Revocations, AL JAZEERA AM. (Jan. 21, 2014),
http://alj.am/1dN18A5; Nick Baumann, Can the Government Confiscate a Citizen’s Passport for
(Apr.
14, 2014),
No
Apparent
Reason?
It Just
Did,
MOTHER JONES
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/04/us-passport-confiscated-embassy-nader-el-dajani;
Cyrus Farivar, Snowden Speaks: By Revoking Passport, US Gov’t Is “Using Citizenship as a
Weapon,” ARS TECHNICA (Jul. 1, 2013), http://ars.to/11bF3G2; Glenn Greenwald, US Muslim
Placed on No-Fly List Is Unable to See His Ailing Mother, GUARDIAN (Nov. 5, 2012),
http://gu.com/p/3btaf/tw; Identity Project, Does a U.S. Citizen Need the Government’s Permission
PLEASE
(Jan.
28,
2014),
to
Return
to
the
U.S.?,
PAPERS,

1/14/2015 12:10 PM

2014]

IMMIGRATION SURVEILLANCE

17

noncitizens and U.S. citizens increasingly have been subject to more
intrusive questioning or searches and seizures at the border—for example,
the seizure, imaging, and search of computer hard drives and other
electronic storage media—with little if any judicial oversight. 53
While individuals previously could travel between the United States
and Mexico, Canada, and the Caribbean without passports, all U.S. citizens
and noncitizens are now required to possess a passport or other approved
travel document to enter the United States under most circumstances. 54
DHS also now exercises greater scrutiny over the rapidly growing number
of individuals enrolled in its registered traveler programs. These programs
provide expedited immigration and customs processing and more limited
airport security screening to approved U.S. citizen and noncitizen travelers
who submit detailed personal information and, following government
background checks, are deemed to present low risks.55
B. Direct Post-Entry Monitoring and Enforcement
Among the policy shifts most widely analyzed by immigration law
scholars has been the growth of direct, post-entry enforcement within the
United States. Historically, once noncitizens had entered the country,
http://papersplease.org/wp/2014/01/28/does-a-us-citizen-need-the-governments-permission-toreturn-to-the-us/; SEGHETTI, supra note 48, at 10. The legality of these practices has been sharply
questioned. See ASIAN AMERICANS ADVANCING JUSTICE ET AL., STRANDED ABROAD: SHADOW
REPORT ON COERCIVE INTERROGATIONS AND DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS IN THE CONFISCATION
OR REVOCATION OF PASSPORTS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS OF YEMENI ORIGIN (2014); Ramzi
Kassem, Passport Revocation As Proxy Denaturalization: Examining the Yemen Cases, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 2099 (2014); Patrick Weil, Citizenship, Passports, and the Legal Identity of
Americans: Edward Snowden and Others Have a Case in the Courts, 123 YALE L.J. F. 565
(2014). For legal challenges, see, for example, Hizam v. Clinton, No. 11 Civ. 7693, 2012 WL
3116026, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2012), rev’d sub nom. Hizam v. Kerry, 747 F.3d 102 (2d Cir.
2014); Complaint, Nagi v. Kerry, No. 14 Civ. 13948 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 14, 2014), ECF No. 1,
available at http://klhn.co/Nagi-EDMich-ECF-1; Kassem, supra, at 2107 n.56.
53. RACHEL LEVINSON-WALDMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHAT THE GOVERNMENT
DOES WITH AMERICANS’ DATA 34–38 (2013); Benjamin J. Rankin, Restoring Privacy at the Border: Extending the Reasonable Suspicion Standard for Laptop Border Searches, 43 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 301 (2011); Ahmed Shihab-Eldin, Davos to Detention: Why I Hate Coming Home to
America, HUFF. POST (Jan. 28, 2014), http://huff.to/1aFH5Dq; Zack Whittaker, Welcome to the
United States: Discriminated, Detained, Searched, Interrogated, ZDNET (Aug. 31, 2013),
http://zd.net/14gUXez; compare United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013) (en
banc) (requiring reasonable suspicion, upon an individual’s arrival at the border, to copy and conduct a forensic examination of the individual’s computer hard drive, but finding that reasonable
suspicion was satisfied); with Abidor v. Napolitano, 990 F. Supp. 2d 260 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (suggesting, in dicta, that suspicionless searches of electronic devices at the border might be permissible).
54. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 § 7209(b), Pub. L. No. 108458, 118 Stat. 3823 (2004); U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, WHTI [WESTERN
HEMISPHERE TRAVEL INITIATIVE] PROGRAM BACKGROUND (2013), http://www.getyouhome.gov.
55. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 § 7208(k); Enhanced Border
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 § 302(b)(1), Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat. 553
(2002).
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immigration officials made little sustained effort to oversee their presence
or investigate grounds for their potential deportation. Even when Congress
first began to enact post-entry deportability grounds, their scope remained
limited. Deportability grounds typically carried statutes of limitations, and
opportunities for discretionary relief from deportation were made widely
available based on an individualized assessment of factors, including
rehabilitation, the effect of deportation on family members, community
involvement, and ties to country of origin. 56
In recent decades, however, the regulation of immigration after
noncitizens have entered the United States has increased dramatically. In
part, post-entry enforcement serves as an extension of regulation of the
territorial border, intended to apprehend noncitizens who are unlawfully
present. Under what Daniel Kanstroom terms an “extended border control”
model of enforcement, officials seek to deport not only unlawful entrants
but also the many individuals—estimated in recent years to comprise
between forty and fifty percent of all unauthorized migrants—who lawfully
enter as temporary nonimmigrants and then overstay or otherwise violate
their terms of admission. 57 But Congress also has fashioned a second
model of deportation by expanding the bases upon which individuals who
are lawfully present may be “delegalized” and deported for post-entry
conduct. 58 The trend toward this model of what Kanstroom calls “postentry social control” has been particularly severe for individuals with postentry criminal convictions.59 Until the 1980s, only a limited number of
serious crimes rendered noncitizens deportable, and in most instances, those
56. Morawetz, supra note 13, at 1938–39; Mae M. Ngai, We Need a Deportation Deadline,
POST
(Jun.
14,
2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpWASH.
dyn/content/article/2005/06/13/AR2005061301460.html.
57. KANSTROOM, supra note 12, at 31–42; see PEW HISPANIC CTR., MODES OF ENTRY FOR
THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION (2006); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-11-411, OVERSTAY ENFORCEMENT: ADDITIONAL MECHANISMS FOR COLLECTING,
ASSESSING, AND SHARING DATA COULD STRENGTHEN DHS’S EFFORTS BUT WOULD HAVE
COSTS (2011). But see BRYAN ROBERTS, EDWARD ALDEN & JOHN WHITLEY, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, MANAGING ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES: HOW
EFFECTIVE IS ENFORCEMENT? 32–33 (2013) (suggesting that the number of new visa overstays
“has dropped sharply in the past decade” and prevailing estimates of overstay population “may be
inflated”). In addition, although no reliable estimates exist concerning their numbers, some individuals also may be deemed unlawfully present because they entered the United States using false
identity documents or genuine documents that were improperly obtained. See KAMAL SADIQ,
PAPER CITIZENS: HOW ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS ACQUIRE CITIZENSHIP IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(2009); RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IMMIGRATION FRAUD: POLICIES,
INVESTIGATIONS, AND ISSUES 1–2 (2008).
58. Aarti Shahani, Legalization and De-Legalization, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Apr. 2006),
http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/civil-rights/3205-legalization-and-de-legalization; see
KANSTROOM, supra note 12, at 31–42 (discussing growth in “post-entry social control” as model
of enforcement); Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration
Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 835-40 (2007) (describing shift in immigration enforcement from “ex
ante” screening in the form of exclusion to “ex post” screening in the form of deportation).
59. KANSTROOM, supra note 12, at 31–42.
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individuals could seek discretionary relief from deportation. Since 1988,
however, Congress has steadily (and at times retroactively) expanded the
list of criminal deportability grounds to include a broad range of
comparatively minor crimes, including a variety of misdemeanors and
nonviolent felonies, and has sharply narrowed eligibility for discretionary
relief. 60
The consequences have been transformative, as federal officials now
place unprecedented emphasis on direct post-entry enforcement within the
United States. Over half of all individuals removed in recent years have
been deported from inside the United States.61 Since 1999, deportation of
individuals with criminal convictions has been the government’s highest
stated interior enforcement priority, and the number of individuals removed
on criminal grounds has increased accordingly. 62 Of the 391,000
individuals removed in 2011, almost half had a prior conviction, compared
to three percent in 1986. 63 Moreover, as the U.S. economy has slumped
since 2008 and the number of unauthorized migrants has dropped—and as
southwestern border enforcement strategies have increasingly emphasized
criminal prosecution rather than immediate expulsion—the number of
informal, “voluntary” returns without formal removal orders, which
typically occur at or near the territorial border, has plummeted. 64 As a
result of these shifts, lawfully present noncitizens have become immigration
enforcement targets to a greater extent than ever before, and the number of
formal removals arising from interior enforcement activities now
significantly dwarfs the number of informal returns arising from
apprehensions at or near the territorial border. 65

60. Morawetz, supra note 13, at 1938–43; Stumpf, supra note 13, at 382–84; see Nancy
Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 97 (1998); Kalhan, supra note 1, at 1155–56.
61. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGR. STATS., supra note 8, at 6.
62. MARC R. ROSENBLUM & WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INTERIOR
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: PROGRAMS TARGETING CRIMINAL ALIENS 12–13 (2012); DEP’T
OF HOMELAND SEC., ENDGAME: DETENTION AND REMOVAL STRATEGIC PLAN, 2003–2012, at 3–
4 (2003).
63. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGR. STATS., supra note 8, at 112.
64. Richard Marosi, New Border Foe: Boredom—U.S. Agents Fight to Stay Awake as Illegal
Crossings Plummet, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2011, at 1; Goodman, supra note 8; see ROSENBLUM ET
AL., supra note 8, at 23 (“[T]oday’s deportation system has been transformed from one that relied
overwhelmingly on informal returns to one that mainly emphasizes formal removal.”).
65. One study of government records estimates that at least twenty percent of noncitizens
removed because of criminal convictions were lawfully present when charged as deportable and
then delegalized in the removal process. In addition, the study noted that in a data set consisting of
almost 900,000 individuals deported on criminal grounds, the government could not identify the
immigration status of approximately 65,000 noncitizens—fully seven percent of the total. HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, FORCED APART (BY THE NUMBERS): NON-CITIZENS DEPORTED MOSTLY FOR
NONVIOLENT OFFENSES 23–26 (2009).

20

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 74:1

This expansion of direct post-entry enforcement consists of several
component mechanisms. First, noncitizens have been subject to more
extensive, ongoing monitoring and registration requirements while in the
United States. While noncitizens have long been required, as a formal
matter, to register and be fingerprinted upon arrival, to carry proof of
registration at all times within the United States, and to notify immigration
officials promptly of changes of address, these provisions went largely
unenforced for decades. 66 Even today, these registration requirements
largely remain a legal fiction. 67 Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the 2001
terrorist attacks, the government did step up both its formal and informal
efforts to monitor certain categories of noncitizens within the United
States. 68 For example, beginning soon after the attacks, the FBI initiated a
program of “voluntary” interviews for thousands of Arab and Muslim men
with nonimmigrant visas. 69 In early 2002, the Justice Department
announced plans to aggressively enforce the change of address provision,
warning of severe adverse consequences for noncompliance. 70 Later in
2002, the Attorney General initiated the National Security Entry-Exit
Registration System (“NSEERS”), which imposed registration requirements
on nonimmigrant men who were at least sixteen years old and current or
former nationals of twenty-five countries, all but one predominantly Arab
or Muslim. 71 Congress and DHS also tightened oversight of international
66. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1306 (2013); see Etuk v. Slattery, 936 F.2d 1433, 1436–37 (2d Cir.
1991) (discussing registration requirements for permanent residents); Rashad Hussain, Preventing
the New Internment: A Security-Sensitive Standard for Equal Protection Claims in the Post-9/11
Era, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 117, 126–27 (2007) (discussing underenforcement of registration provisions); Nancy Morawetz & Natasha J. Silber, Immigration Law and the Myth of Comprehensive
Registration, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 6, 48), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2469403 (describing the widespread assumption that a comprehensive
federal alien registration system exists in practice as a “dangerous myth” and “insidious misconception”).
67. See Morawetz & Silber, supra note 66 (manuscript at 27) (“Most noncitizens in the United States are exempt from registration and carry requirements pursuant to statute, regulation, administrative design, and systemic inefficiencies.”).
68. See Rey Koslowski, Smart Borders, Virtual Borders or No Borders: Homeland Security
Choices for the United States and Canada, 11 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 527, 533–34 (2005); Victor
C. Romero, Noncitizen Students and Immigration Policy Post-9/11, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 357
(2002).
69. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HOMELAND SECURITY: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S
PROJECT TO INTERVIEW ALIENS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 (2003); LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL: LIBERTY AND SECURITY FOR THE POSTSEPTEMBER 11 UNITED STATES 40–41 (2003).
70. MUZAFFAR A. CHISHTI, DORIS MEISSNER, DEMETRIOS G. PAPADEMETRIOU, JAY
PETERZELL, MICHAEL J. WISHNIE & STEPHEN W. YALE-LOEHR, MIGRATION POL’Y INST.,
AMERICA’S CHALLENGE: DOMESTIC SECURITY, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND NATIONAL UNITY AFTER
SEPTEMBER 11, at 161 (2003). The announcement prompted a deluge of close to one million
change-of-address forms to be filed within the year.
71. RIGHTS WORKING GROUP, THE NSEERS EFFECT: A DECADE OF RACIAL PROFILING,
FEAR, AND SECRECY 15–16 (2012).
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students and schools where they are enrolled to ensure compliance with the
terms of student visas. 72
Second, DHS has devoted substantially more resources to post-entry
investigations. 73
In 2002, DHS launched an initiative targeting
“absconders” or “fugitives,” categories that it defines to include (1)
individuals with removal orders who have not departed the United States
and (2) individuals who have otherwise failed to report to ICE when
required. 74 Between 2003 and 2010, funding for these programs spiraled
from $9 million to over $230 million, increasing the personnel devoted to
these programs by more than 1300%. 75 The operations conducted under
these programs have involved tactics ranging from undercover
investigations to high profile, paramilitary-style home and workplace raids
and blanket community sweeps in apartment complexes, grocery stores,
laundromats, and parks. 76
Third, federal officials have enlisted hundreds of thousands of state
and local law enforcement and corrections officials in immigration
policing. 77 These initiatives, whose particular manifestations have evolved
swiftly, seek to identify potentially deportable noncitizens by screening
individuals when they are arrested, convicted, and incarcerated to determine
their citizenship and immigration status and potential deportability. In
addition to these federal initiatives, some states and localities unilaterally
have sought to become directly involved in immigration policing. For
example, several states and localities—most prominently Arizona, with its
controversial and widely-noted Senate Bill 1070—have authorized or
required law enforcement to inquire about the immigration status of
individuals they encounter and in some instances to convey that information
to federal immigration officials.78 While the Supreme Court left open the
72. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-572, STUDENT AND EXCHANGE
VISITOR PROGRAM: DHS NEEDS TO ASSESS RISKS AND STRENGTHEN OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS
(2012); Romero, supra note 68.
73. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 62.
74. MARGOT MENDELSON, SHAYNA STROM, & MICHAEL WISHNIE, MIGRATION POL’Y
INST., COLLATERAL DAMAGE: AN EXAMINATION OF ICE’S FUGITIVE OPERATIONS PROGRAM
(2009).
75. MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 102.
76. MENDELSON ET AL., supra note 74, at 6–11; NEW ORLEANS WORKERS’ CENTER FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE, THE CRIMINAL ALIEN REMOVAL INITIATIVE IN NEW ORLEANS: THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION’S BRUTAL NEW FRONTIER IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT (2013); CARDOZO
IMMIGR. JUSTICE CLINIC, CONSTITUTION ON ICE: A REPORT ON IMMIGRATION HOME RAID
OPERATIONS (2009); Aldana, supra note 14.
77. Kalhan, supra note 9; see also Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563,
1579–98 (2010).
78. S.B. 1070 § 2, 49th Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2010); see Gabriel J. Chin, Carissa Byrne
Hessick, Toni Massaro, & Marc L. Miller, A Legal Labyrinth: Issues Raised by Arizona Senate
Bill 1070, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47 (2010); Kevin Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights: Is the
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possibility of as-applied challenges to Section 2 when it reviewed SB 1070,
it declined to facially invalidate the provision, and it has previously
signaled its willingness to tolerate an active role for state and local police in
direct immigration enforcement. 79
Fourth, federal officials have increasingly deployed removal
mechanisms involving little or no formal adjudication. As with expedited
removal at the border, officials have utilized a number of streamlined
mechanisms to expel deportable noncitizens without full administrative
hearings. For example, DHS has increasingly relied upon stipulated
removal, by which noncitizens agree to entry of formal removal orders
while simultaneously waiving the right to full removal hearings before
immigration judges, and reinstatement of removal, a mechanism that
permits previous removal orders to be reinstated without further
adjudication. 80 Reinstatements of prior removal orders have steadily
increased and totaled more than 149,000 in 2012, representing more than
one-third of all removal orders, and stipulated removal orders are now
estimated to constitute between ten and thirty percent of all removal
orders. 81 Each year, removal orders are also issued in absentia and without
further adjudication to thousands of noncitizens who fail to appear for
hearings, in many cases due to improper notice. 82 Expedited removal itself
also has been extended from the territorial border to the interior of the
United States, under provisions permitting its application to noncitizens if
they are apprehended within a zone extending 100 miles from the territorial
border and are caught within fourteen days of their entry. 83 Taken together,
these means of removal without adjudication have constituted the
overwhelming majority of formal removals in recent years. In 2012, for
example, it is estimated that approximately seventy-five percent of all
removals were effectuated using these mechanisms, an increase from only
three percent in 1995 and 1996. 84
“New” Birmingham the Same as the “Old” Birmingham?, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 367
(2012); Kalhan, supra note 1, at 1164–65.
79. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2507–11 (2012); Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S.
93, 100–01 (2005); Chacón, supra note 15, at 580 (arguing that Arizona “effectively green-lighted
systematic state and local participation in immigration enforcement”).
80. Jennifer Lee Koh, Waiving Due Process (Goodbye): Stipulated Orders of Removal and
the Crisis in Immigration Adjudication, 91 N.C. L. REV. 475 (2013); Family, supra note 13;
ROSENBLUM ET AL., supra note 8, at 24–27.
81. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGR. STATS., supra note 8, at 5; Koh, supra
note 80, at 509–10.
82. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGR. REV., FY 2012 STATISTICAL YEAR
BOOK H1–H4 (2013); see Lenni B. Benson, You Can’t Get There from Here: Managing Judicial
Review of Immigration Cases, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 405, 417–21 (2007).
83. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (2013); A.B.A. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 5, at 1-43 to
1-44. Albeit less formally, DHS also induces large numbers of noncitizens to “voluntarily” waive
rights to full adjudication. Family, supra note 13.
84. ROSENBLUM ET AL., supra note 8, at 26–27.
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C. Indirect Post-Entry Monitoring and Enforcement
Especially over the past decade, these direct post-entry enforcement
programs have been supplemented by a growing number of indirect
enforcement initiatives. 85 These indirect initiatives restrict access to rights,
benefits, and services on the basis of immigration or citizenship status,
thereby requiring both public and private actors—including social service
agencies, educational institutions, hospitals, driver’s license bureaus,
employers, landlords, and transportation carriers—to verify immigration
and citizenship status to make eligibility determinations. These initiatives
enforce immigration law indirectly insofar as they are not always intended
primarily to apprehend potentially deportable individuals but nevertheless
seek to encourage “self-deportation.” 86 They also can facilitate direct
enforcement by collecting and storing information that later can be used to
identify and arrest potentially deportable individuals. Indirect enforcement
programs can operate more directly when they require reporting of
individuals suspected to be potentially deportable to immigration officials. 87
Since 1986, the principal means of indirect enforcement under federal
law has been the Immigration Reform and Control Act’s (“IRCA”)
employer sanctions regime, which prohibits employers from knowingly
hiring unauthorized workers and requires them to verify the identity and
work eligibility of all new hires. 88 Enforcement of IRCA’s civil and
criminal sanctions has been uneven at best, but since 2006, DHS has
ramped up its workplace enforcement efforts.89 Under the Obama
Administration, workplace employment strategies have shifted from high
profile workplace raids seeking to directly identify and apprehend
potentially deportable noncitizens to more indirect initiatives monitoring
employers’ compliance with IRCA’s requirements. 90
85. Kalhan, supra note 1, at 1158–60; see also Rodríguez, supra note 15, at 592–93; Rick Su,
A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619, 1642–49 (2008).
86. MARK KRIKORIAN, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD., DOWNSIZING ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION: A
STRATEGY OF ATTRITION THROUGH ENFORCEMENT 5 (2005); William Safire, Self-Deportation?,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1994, at A15.
87. Kalhan, supra note 1; see Linda Bosniak, The Undocumented Immigrant: Contending
Policy Approaches, in DEBATING IMMIGRATION 85, 92 (Carol M. Swain ed., 2007) (noting proponents’ view that “verification and reporting requirements serve as an indispensable enforcement
supplement”).
88. Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99–603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986); Wishnie, supra note 6. DHS also has cultivated formal partnerships that encourage employers to directly report information on noncitizens suspected to be deportable. Maya Elbert, ICE Establishes
IMAGE Program, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 717 (2006); Darcy Pottle, Federal Employer Sanctions as
Immigration Federalism, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 99 (2010).
89. BRUNO, supra note 8; MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 76–87.
90. See Memorandum from Marcy M. Forman, Director, Office of Investigations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Worksite Enforcement Strategy (Apr. 30, 2009); Julia Preston, U.S. Shifts Strategy on Illicit Work by Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 3, 2009, at A1. Owing to
this shift, DHS has audited over 8000 employers and barred 726 employers from participating in
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But indirect initiatives to enforce immigration law have not been
limited to employer sanctions. For example, Congress has established
mandatory eligibility restrictions for certain public benefits programs on the
basis of immigration and citizenship status and has authorized state
governments to adopt alienage-based restrictions on access to other benefits
programs. 91 Congress has sought to regulate migrants’ access to stateissued driver’s licenses and other identification documents by mandating
minimum standards—and in particular, immigration-status-based eligibility
requirements—for them to be accepted as identification for certain federal
purposes, such as entering federal buildings or boarding commercial airline
flights. 92 Most recently, in adopting the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, Congress explicitly barred unauthorized immigrants from
participating in the exchanges and temporary high-risk pools established
under the law or receiving the legislation’s subsidies and credits for health
insurance premiums. 93 Within the executive branch, on occasion federal
prosecutors have applied the criminal prohibition against transporting
noncitizens in knowing or reckless disregard of their unlawful entry or
presence to domestic transportation carriers, such as bus lines. 94
State and local governments also have been active in adopting indirect
enforcement initiatives. 95
For example, some jurisdictions have
supplemented IRCA with employer sanctions regimes of their own, for
which the Supreme Court has recently held that IRCA itself leaves some

federal contracts during the past four years, compared with approximately 500 audits and one
barred employer during the final year of the Bush Administration. The number of final orders
assessing monetary penalties increased from eighteen in 2008 to well over 300 in the first three
quarters of 2011 alone. MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 83.
91. E.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611–1612, 1621–1622, 1632, 1641 (2013); see Michael J. Wishnie,
Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 513–14 (2001).
92. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 302, 302–23 (2005);
Kalhan, supra note 15, at 191–93.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 18032(f)(3) (2013); ALISON SISKIN & ERIKA K. LUNDER, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., TREATMENT OF NONCITIZENS UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (2014); Polly J. Price,
Can U.S. Immigration Law Be Reconciled with the Protection of Public Health?, 17 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2397524; Elise
Foley, Affordable Care Act Won’t Apply to Immigrants Granted Deferred Action, HUFF. POST,
(Aug. 31, 2012), http://huff.to/Q7vJuA; Michael K. Gusmano, Undocumented Immigrants in the
United States: U.S. Health Policy and Access to Care, UNDOCUMENTED PATIENTS (Oct. 3, 2012),
http://www.undocumentedpatients.org/issuebrief/health-policy-and-access-to-care/; Esther Yu-Hsi
Lee, A Simple Guide To The Affordable Care Act For Immigrants, THINKPROGRESS (Oct. 1,
2013), http://thkpr.gs/1hiY8YU.
94. Eisha Jain, Immigration Enforcement and Harboring Doctrine, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 147
(2010); Huyen Pham, The Private Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 777, 793–96
(2008).
95. 2012 Immigration-Related Laws and Resolutions in the States, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (2013), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/2012-immigration-relatedlaws-jan-december-2012.aspx.
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room. 96 Other indirect initiatives go well beyond employer sanctions laws
by significantly expanding the circumstances in which eligibility criteria for
various services and benefits are based on citizenship or immigration status.
These initiatives have dramatically expanded the categories of public and
private actors that are placed in the position of collecting, storing, verifying,
and disseminating immigration and citizenship status information, together
with large quantities of other personal information, on a day-to-day basis. 97
D. Criminal Prosecution of Migration-Related Offenses
The growing convergence between immigration and criminal law
enforcement regimes has prompted huge increases in federal criminal
prosecutions for immigration enforcement purposes.98 Federal prosecutions
for migration-related offenses have spiked in recent years, from
approximately 7,000 in 1992 to almost 100,000 in 2013. 99 Much of the
recent increase may be attributed to “Operation Streamline,” an initiative in
districts along the U.S.-Mexico border in which ICE and CBP officials—
who previously referred only the most severe violations for criminal
prosecution—routinely refer unlawful border crossers to be prosecuted for
illegal entry or reentry, rather than informally or formally removing
them. 100 As a result, federal prosecutors now prosecute more migration-

96. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011) (holding that Arizona’s employer sanctions scheme was not preempted); see DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (holding
that pre-IRCA California employers sanctions law was not preempted); Kati L. Griffith, Discovering “Immployment” Law: The Constitutionality of Subfederal Immigration Regulation at Work,
29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 389 (2011).
97. Kalhan, supra note 1.
98. Chacón, supra note 7; Eagly, supra note 7. By one count, federal law includes at least
forty-seven separate provisions for immigration-related criminal offenses. Kris W. Kobach, The
Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 219–21 (2005). Several states have also adopted migration-related
criminal offenses. The Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. United States, which invalidated
SB 1070’s criminal provisions as preempted, has trimmed the sails of these efforts. However, it
remains to be seen whether Arizona leaves room for states and localities to enforce criminal laws
touching upon migration-related matters less directly—for example, laws that are formally of general applicability, such as those criminalizing human trafficking and identity theft, but motivated
by immigration-related aims or targeting conduct associated with migration. Ingrid V. Eagly, Local Immigration Prosecution: A Study of Arizona Before SB 1070, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1749 (2010);
Su, supra note 85, at 1649–53 (discussing “neutral” local regulations that disproportionately affect
noncitizens and are “enacted and enforced precisely for this reason”).
99. At Nearly 100,000, Immigration Prosecutions Reach All-Time High in FY 2013, TRAC
IMMIGR. (Nov. 25, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/336.
100. ALISTAIR GRAHAM ROBERTSON, RACHEL BEATY, JANE ATKINSON & BOB LIBAL,
GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP, OPERATION STREAMLINE: COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES (2012); Joanna Lydgate, Assembly-Line Justice: A Review of Operation Streamline, 98 CAL. L. REV. 481
(2010); Fernanda Santos, Detainees Sentenced in Seconds in “Streamline” Justice on Border,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2014, at A12; Donald Kerwin & Kristen McCabe, Arrested on Entry: Operation Streamline and the Prosecution of Immigration Crimes, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Apr. 29,
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related offenses than all other categories of crime combined, of which
approximately two-thirds come from southwestern border districts.101 The
overwhelming majority of immigration-related criminal convictions have
been for illegal entry or reentry. Prosecutions for more serious or complex
migration-related offenses, such as human smuggling, human trafficking,
migration-related fraud, and willful hiring of unauthorized workers, remain
exceedingly less prevalent. 102
E. Exit Controls
Finally, DHS has implemented mechanisms to monitor and control
departures from the United States. In a series of laws dating back to 1996,
Congress has mandated the establishment of a comprehensive, automated
system to monitor and collect records of the departure of every noncitizen
lawfully admitted to the United States. 103 This system seeks to match
departure records with arrival records to confirm whether noncitizens
admitted under temporary, nonimmigrant admission categories have
departed the United States when required and to identify individuals who
have “overstayed.” As with screening and registration upon initial entry, a
complete exit control system necessarily involves monitoring and verifying
citizenship and immigration status for all individuals traveling from the
United States. Increasingly, exit controls have been justified with reference
to national security and criminal law enforcement. 104 At some locations
along the U.S.-Mexico border, departing individuals are subject to
additional screening under initiatives that target drug trafficking. 105 Other
mechanisms restrict the ability of noncitizens to travel outside the United
States altogether. 106
While implementation of this system has proven challenging, the
federal government has continued to make considerable investments in its
development and automation. Under the system in place for many years,
2010),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/arrested-entry-operation-streamline-andprosecution-immigration-crimes.
101. MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 93–94.
102. Immigration Prosecutions for April 2014, TRAC IMMIGR., (Jul. 3. 2014),
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/immigration/monthlyapr14/fil.
103. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118
Stat. 3638 (2004); Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-173, 116 Stat. 543 (2002); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 § 414, Pub. L.
No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-215, 114 Stat. 337 (2000); Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act § 110, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
104. See, e.g., MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 57–59.
105. SEGHETTI, supra note 49, at 20–21.
106. Morawetz, Invisible Border, supra note 40, at 205–20; see also MASSEY ET AL., supra
note 24, at 105–18, 126–36.
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nonimmigrants would fill out an I-94 arrival/departure form when seeking
admission at the border. Upon admission, border inspectors would stamp
and retain this form, returning to individuals a departure receipt to be
submitted to transportation carriers upon departure and then forwarded to
immigration officials.107 This process has recently been automated for
individuals arriving by air and sea, and immigration officials have piloted
automated systems to track exits by verifying and collecting biometric
identification information from these travelers. 108 Immigration reform
proposals in Congress would go further by requiring air and sea carriers to
collect exit data from passengers before departing the United States. 109
II. THE NEW SURVEILLANCE INFRASTRUCTURE OF MASS IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT
As these immigration enforcement activities have widely proliferated,
and the scale of the enforcement regime’s “formidable machinery” has
grown and solidified, authorities have deployed a variety of new
surveillance, dataveillance, and tracking systems as key components of their
enforcement strategies at every stage of the migration process.110 In this
Part, I analyze the swift, extensive, and largely unconstrained
implementation of these technologies, which have given rise to what I term,
adapting from Jack Balkin, the immigration surveillance state: an approach
to immigration governance “that features the collection, collation, and
analysis of information about populations . . . to identify problems, to head
off potential threats, to govern populations, and to deliver valuable social
services.” 111 These systems enable and routinize the collection, storage,
aggregation, processing, and dissemination of detailed personal information
for immigration control and other purposes on an unprecedented scale and
facilitate the involvement of an escalating number of federal, state, local,
private, and non-U.S. actors in immigration control activities.

107. ALDEN, supra note 46, at 66.
108. Interim Final Rule, Electronic Form I-94, 78 Fed. Reg. 18457 (Mar. 27, 2013) (codified
at 8 C.F.R. § 1.4 (2014)); REY KOSLOWSKI, REAL CHALLENGES FOR VIRTUAL BORDERS: THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF US-VISIT 6–7 (2005); Mark Stevens, Exit Tracking: Should the Federal
Government Track Noncitizens’ Departures from the United States?, 3 AM. U. NAT’L SECURITY
L. BRIEF 11 (2012).
109. Border Security, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013, S.
744, 113th Cong. § 3303 (as passed by Senate, June 27, 2013); MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 5, at
58–59; see CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD., TEN REASONS WHY BIOMETRIC EXIT MAY ADVANCE IN
2014 (2014).
110. MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 5; see Edward Alden, Immigration and Border Control, 32
CATO J. 107, 114 (2012) (“Entry into the United States from overseas now involves passing
through an extraordinary, high-technology security gauntlet . . . .”).
111. Balkin, supra note 4, at 3 (conceptualizing “national surveillance state”); see Hosein, supra note 23; Kalhan, supra note 9, at 1109–10.
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First, I develop and articulate a framework within which to analyze
these developments, disaggregating “immigration enforcement” as a
category to identify and analyze the specific purposes for which new
surveillance processes and systems have been implemented. These
purposes fall into four broad categories: identifying individuals, screening
and authorizing individuals, tracking and controlling mobility, and sharing
information. Second, I highlight and assess the deployment of new
technologies—across all of the different enforcement initiatives discussed
in Part I—to control the territorial border, to monitor and regulate entry,
exit, and travel by both noncitizens and U.S. citizens, and to monitor and
regulate noncitizens after entry into the United States.
A. The Functions and Practices of Immigration Surveillance
As conceptualized by John Gilliom and Torin Monahan, surveillance
involves “the systematic monitoring, gathering, and analysis of information
in order to make decisions, minimize risk, sort populations, and exercise
power.” 112 In this Section, I identify and analyze a series of specific
surveillance practices and technologies that have become increasingly
important components of immigration enforcement strategies.
The
processes and technologies that comprise the information infrastructure of
immigration enforcement enable new approaches to four distinct sets of
surveillance activities: identification, screening and authorization, mobility
tracking and control, and information sharing.
1. Identification
Perhaps as much as anything else, the recent expansion of immigration
enforcement has helped spark heightened attention to identification—and in
particular, the deployment of systems that seek to authenticate or verify the
identity of a particular individual (“Is this person who she says she is?”) or
to ascertain the identity of an unknown individual (“Who is this person?” or
“Who generated this biometric?”).113 Identification mechanisms, of course,
have always been a central element of immigration regulation. While one’s

112. GILLIOM & MONAHAN, supra note 4, at 2; see LYON, supra note 4, at 14 (defining surveillance as the “focused, systematic, and routine attention to personal details for purposes of influence, management, protection, or direction”); Roger Clarke, Information Technology and
Dataveillance, 31 COMM. ACM 498, 499 (1988) (conceptualizing “dataveillance” as “the systematic use of personal data systems in the investigation or monitoring of the actions . . . of one or
more persons”); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 490–91 (2005)
(advancing “taxonomy” of “privacy problems” that arise from collection, processing, and dissemination of personal information).
113. JENNIFER LYNCH, FROM FINGERPRINTS TO DNA: BIOMETRIC DATA COLLECTION IN
U.S. IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES AND BEYOND 5 (2012); see BRUCE SCHNEIER, BEYOND FEAR:
THINKING SENSIBLY ABOUT SECURITY IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD, 181–206 (2003) (distinguishing among identification, authentication, and authorization in security systems).
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identity ordinarily plays no role in most aspects of day-to-day life for either
noncitizens or U.S. citizens, rules governing admissibility or deportability
necessarily require authorities to accurately identify and determine the
particular individuals who are eligible for admission or subject to
deportation. 114 Debates over the proper role and scope of identification
systems for immigration regulation purposes—including most prominently,
in recent decades, the potential role of a mandatory, standardized national
ID card—have accordingly persisted and recurred over many
generations. 115
Even as debates over the appropriate role of identification systems in
immigration governance have assumed renewed prominence in recent
years—as they have, increasingly, in debates about governance more
generally—a set of de facto national identification systems already are
taking shape. 116 Although current efforts to develop identification systems
for immigration control purposes have origins in initiatives taken during the
1990s, the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks has hastened their
development. In its reports, the September 11 Commission emphasized the
ability of the 2001 hijackers to obtain various U.S. identification
documents, in some cases by fraud, and the failure of immigration and law
enforcement officials who they had previously encountered to identify them
and ascertain the threats that they posed. Accordingly, the Commission
recommended the establishment of a comprehensive screening system that
would collect, store, process, and share detailed personal information, along
with the development of more secure identification documents, in order to
identify individuals at the border and in a range of other areas of social life

114. Kalhan, supra note 1, at 1141–42; see DAVID LYON, IDENTIFYING CITIZENS: ID CARDS
(2009); SCHNEIER, supra note 112.
115. Magdalena Krajewska, The Politics of National Identification Documents in the United
Kingdom and the United States, 1915–2010, at 257–404 (Aug. 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis University); see A. MICHAEL FROOMKIN & JONATHAN WEINBERG, HARD TO
BELIEVE: THE HIGH COST OF A BIOMETRIC IDENTITY CARD (2012); SIMSON GARFINKEL,
DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 37–67 (2000); JAMES G.
GIMPEL & JAMES R. EDWARDS, JR., THE CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION REFORM
88–89, 162–63 (1999); Daniel J. Steinbock, National Identity Cards: Fourth and Fifth Amendment
Issues, 56 FLA. L. REV. 697 (2004).
116. A. Michael Froomkin, The Uneasy Case for National ID Cards, in SECURING PRIVACY
IN THE INTERNET AGE 295, 308 (Anupam Chander, Lauren Gelman, & Margaret Jane Radin eds.,
2008) (arguing that “enormous growth of the ability to link distributed databases means that we
already have, or will soon have, a ‘virtual’ national identification system”); see RICHARD L.
HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT ELECTION MELTDOWN 41–73
(2012) (discussing voter ID laws); CASSANDRA Q. BUTTS & PETER SWIRE, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS, THE ID DIVIDE (2008); CARL WATNER & WENDY MCELROY, NATIONAL
IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS: ESSAYS IN OPPOSITION (2004); Cristina Costantini, Municipal ID
Cards Given To Undocumented Immigrants In Cities Across The U.S. With Varied Success, HUFF.
POST (Oct. 24, 2011), http://huff.to/qSpa8q.
AS SURVEILLANCE
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within the United States in order to assess any risks that they might
present. 117
Infused with this national security significance—and substantial
resources, as a result—immigration authorities have implemented a
complex and far-reaching set of identification systems. 118 Officials now
collect large quantities of personal information about both noncitizens and
U.S. citizens in a variety of different contexts. In line with the September
11 Commission’s recommendations—but building upon nascent initiatives
already under way before the 2001 terrorist attacks—these systems collect
not only biographic data but also biometric identifiers, which are “unique
markers that identify or verify the identity of people using intrinsic physical
or behavioral characteristics,” such as fingerprints, facial recognition-ready
digital photographs, iris scans, DNA, palm prints, hand vein scans, or voice
prints. 119 Based on the supposition that automated biometric processes
enable efficient and highly accurate identification of individuals, their use
has exploded since 2001, with immigration control serving as a leading
edge of this trend. 120
Immigration authorities store this biographic and biometric
information in a growing system of interoperable databases. At the core of
this database network is DHS’s Automated Biometric Identification System
(“IDENT”), which INS originally developed to help the Border Patrol
identify and track individuals unlawfully crossing the U.S.–Mexico border.
Today, IDENT is used for a much broader variety of immigration and
security-related functions and constitutes the main DHS-wide biographic
and biometric information system. 121 Growing at a rate of ten million new
entries per year, IDENT holds records on over 160 million subjects who

117. 9/11 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 41, at 383–90; see NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, 9/11 AND TERRORIST TRAVEL: STAFF REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (2004) [hereinafter
TERRORIST TRAVEL REPORT].
118. JULIA ANGWIN, DRAGNET NATION: A QUEST FOR PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND FREEDOM
IN A WORLD OF RELENTLESS SURVEILLANCE 27–28 (2014); Laura K. Donohue, Technological
Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97
MINN. L. REV. 407, 425 (2012).
119. LYNCH, supra note 113, at 4; see also 9/11 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 41, at 383–90;
JOSEPH N. PATO & LYNETTE I. MILLETT, BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION: CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES 31–36 (2010).
120. SHOSHANA AMIELLE MAGNET, WHEN BIOMETRICS FAIL: GENDER, RACE, AND THE
TECHNOLOGY OF IDENTITY 10 (2011) (“Biometrics are celebrated as perfect identification technologies.”); see NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11:
ADVANCING SCIENCE, ENHANCING OPERATIONS (2008) [hereinafter BIOMETRICS IN
GOVERNMENT POST-9/11]; Margaret Hu, Biometric ID Cybersurveillance, 88 IND. L.J. 1475
(2013).
121. System of Records Notice for IDENT, 72 Fed. Reg. 31,080 (June 5, 2007). Within DHS,
IDENT is managed by the Office of Biometric Identity Management, which in 2013 replaced a
program previously known as US-VISIT.
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have had any contact with DHS, other agencies, and even other
governments—including visa applicants at U.S. embassies and consulates,
noncitizens traveling to and from the United States, noncitizens applying
for immigration benefits (including asylum), unauthorized migrants
apprehended at the border or at sea, suspected immigration law violators
encountered or arrested within the United States, and even U.S. citizens
enrolled in DHS’s registered traveler programs or who have adopted
children from abroad. Given its data collection and retention practices,
IDENT also contains fingerprint records for many naturalized U.S. citizens
who were fingerprinted before naturalizing and lawfully present
noncitizens. 122 At the same time, IDENT does not include records of
noncitizens who have never had any contact with DHS, such as those who
entered the United States without inspection.123
Finally, Congress and immigration authorities have required both
noncitizen and U.S. citizen travelers to possess secure identification and
travel documents that can be linked to these database records. 124
Noncitizens entering the United States under the Visa Waiver Program
must possess machine-readable passports that incorporate biometric
identifiers, and the visas issued to other noncitizen travelers by the State
Department are now tamper-resistant, machine-readable documents that
include biometric identifiers linked to records in DHS’s databases. Other
identification, travel, and entry documents issued to noncitizens, such as
employment authorization documents and permanent resident cards, have
similar enhancements. 125 U.S. citizen travelers also are subject to enhanced
identification and travel document requirements. All U.S. citizens must
possess a passport or other approved travel document to enter the United
States, and since 2007, all newly issued U.S. passports have been so-called
“e-passports.” These machine-readable documents not only include
electronically printed digital photographs, but also are embedded with radio
frequency identification (“RFID”) chips containing biographic and
biometric data about the document holder that can be read wirelessly and
122. Kalhan, supra note 9, at 127–28.
123. Internal government documents indicate that DHS may also be retaining in IDENT the
fingerprints of all U.S. citizens whose fingerprints have been shared by the FBI through the Secure
Communities program. Id.; SEGHETTI, supra note 49, at 23.
124. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 §§ 7209, 7218, Pub. L. No.
108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, VISA AND PASSPORT SECURITY
STRATEGIC PLAN (2007).
125. Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 § 303, Pub. L. No. 107173, 116 Stat. 543 (2002) (mandating use of biometric identifiers in visas and travel documents
issued to noncitizens); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act § 403, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001) (mandating biometric collection and screening for all visa applicants); see
BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 120, at 44–46; KATHERINE GIGLIOTTI &
ANN MORSE, THE ABCS OF IDS FOR U.S. IMMIGRANTS: A PRIMER FOR STATE LEGISLATORS
(2004).
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linked to government databases. 126 Congress also has enacted legislation
providing that state driver’s licenses and ID cards may be accepted for
official purposes by federal agencies only if the state satisfies minimum
federal standards for eligibility criteria, application procedures, document
contents, and document security. 127
2. Analysis, Screening, and Authorization
Hand-in-hand with these identification systems, policymakers have
implemented a variety of authorization mechanisms to facilitate large-scale
analysis and screening of migrants and travelers, once they have been
identified, in the many settings in which immigration control activities now
take place and require screening and authorization based on immigration
status, citizenship status, or other criteria. 128 With the widespread
expansion of immigration enforcement activities, as discussed in Part I,
these settings are now manifold—ranging from U.S. consulates, airline
check-in counters, and ports of entry to local police stations, private
workplaces, benefits agencies, universities, health insurers and providers,
and beyond. 129
The specific processes and criteria used in these various settings differ
depending on the particular context and immigration control activities
involved. In many instances, screening and authorization can involve
seemingly straightforward determinations, such as whether individuals are
noncitizens or U.S. citizens or whether noncitizens are clearly inadmissible
or deportable. However, determinations of citizenship status, potential
inadmissibility or deportability, employment authorization, benefits
eligibility, and other screening determinations involved in these various
immigration enforcement programs often can be more complex than they
appear, requiring collection and synthesis of information from multiple
sources, interpretation, clarification, analysis, and the exercise of discretion

126. Other travel documents approved for U.S. citizens under some circumstances, such as
passport cards, enhanced driver’s licenses, and registered traveler documents, have similar enhancements. MONICA NOGUEIRA & NOEL GREIS, USES OF RFID TECHNOLOGY IN U.S.
IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS (2009); Jonathan Weinberg, Tracking RFID, 3 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y
INFO. SOC’Y 777, 800–02 (2007).
127. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 § 7212(b), Pub. L. No. 108458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004); REAL ID Act of 2005 § 202, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat.
302, 302–23 (2005); see Kalhan, supra note 15; see also Serge Egelman & Lorrie Faith Cranor,
The Real ID Act: Fixing Identity Documents with Duct Tape, 2 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 149
(2006).
128. SCHNEIER, supra note 113, at 183–84; Froomkin, supra note 116, at 297 (“People who
control resources . . . want or need to know who you really are in order to allow the interaction or
transaction, and they want or need to keep a record of it.”).
129. Bosniak, supra note 87, at 90–91.
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and judgment. 130 Moreover, in a growing number of situations, these
screening determinations are made using predictive, probabilistic risk
assessments that may be automated or semi-automated. 131
Screening and authorization systems perform two categories of
interrelated, mutually complementary “sorting” functions. 132 On the one
hand, authorities rely upon information in these systems to identify
individuals who should be denied authorization in a particular context or
who are deemed to require closer attention and scrutiny. For example,
actors involved in visa processing, border inspection, and immigration
policing screen the names of individuals whom they encounter against
information in the FBI’s main criminal records database, the National
Crime Information Center (“NCIC”)—a clearinghouse that includes
information on criminal history and outstanding warrants—to determine
whether they may be inadmissible to enter the United States or potentially
deportable. 133 These officials also screen the names of these individuals
against watchlists generated from the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Database
(“TSDB”), a consolidated antiterrorism watchlist containing over one
million records on approximately 400,000 subjects identified and
designated as known or suspected terrorists. Individuals are periodically
added and removed from the TSDB, and from this master database the FBI
generates and distributes several more specific lists, such as the No Fly List
and the Automatic Selectee List, to various immigration control, criminal
law enforcement, and transportation security authorities in the United States
130. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 377–78 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that
“whether a conviction for a particular offense will make an alien removable is often quite complex,” and that criminal lawyers “who consult[] a guidebook” to make that determination “will
often find that the answer is not ‘easily ascertained’”); Seth M.M. Stodder, Finding Terrorist Needles: The Automated Targeting System, 9 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 84, 85
(2008) (emphasizing complexity of role played by CBP inspectors at ports of entry); see also
Kalhan, supra note 9, at 1138; Jennifer Lee Koh, Rethinking Removability, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1803
(2013); Rachel E. Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line: Rethinking Immigration Exceptionalism, 54
B.C. L. REV. 1965, 1967–68 (2013); Juliet P. Stumpf, Getting to Work: Why Nobody Cares About
E-Verify (And Why They Should), 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 381, 392–95 (2012).
131. Stodder, supra note 130 (discussing CBP’s Automated Targeting System); WESTAT
CORP., EVALUATION OF THE ACCURACY OF E-VERIFY FINDINGS 3 (2012) (discussing “complex
matching algorithms” and search processes used by E-Verify); see Danielle Keats Citron & Frank
A. Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1
(2014) (highlighting expanded use of “scoring systems” that aggregate information and use predictive algorithms to score and rank individuals when making various decisions about those individuals); Citron, supra note 19, at 1263–67 (identifying and categorizing different types of automated and semi-automated decision-making systems being used in administrative agencies’
decision making processes).
132. David Lyon, Surveillance as Social Sorting: Computer Codes and Mobile Bodies, in
SURVEILLANCE AS SOCIAL SORTING: PRIVACY, RISK, AND DIGITAL DISCRIMINATION 13, 20 (David Lyon ed., 2003) (discussing use of surveillance “to classify people and populations according
to varying criteria, to determine who should be targeted for special treatment, suspicion, eligibility, inclusion, access”).
133. Kalhan, supra note 9 (discussing NCIC).

34

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 74:1

and other countries. 134 Increasingly, employers subject to employer
sanctions screen the names of their employees against the federal
government’s E-Verify database system to determine whether they are
authorized to work in the United States.135 The Affordable Care Act
requires electronic verification of citizenship and lawful presence for all
individuals seeking to purchase health insurance through the governmentestablished exchanges, to obtain credits or subsidies for health insurance
premiums, or to secure benefits under Medicaid or the Children’s Health
Insurance Program (“CHIP”). 136
Other systems aggregate and analyze information from a multiplicity
of sources to furnish automated, probabilistic risk assessments to officials in
real time, with the goal of identifying unknown individuals whose names
might not be listed in immigration, criminal records, or antiterrorism
databases, but whose information matches previously identified profiles and
who therefore are deemed to warrant closer scrutiny. For example, CBP’s
Automated Targeting System (“ATS”), a “decision support tool” originally
developed by the U.S. Customs Service to screen cargo for illegal drugs and
other contraband, aggregates detailed information about all travelers
entering and leaving the United States and assesses the risks presented by
each of them in order to identify and prioritize individuals deemed to
warrant greater attention by CBP border inspectors. 137 The ATS analyzes
information collected from a wide variety of different sources, including
information collected from transportation carriers about travelers and
information contained in a broad array of other government databases.138

134. Homeland Security Presidential Directive No. 6, Integration and Use of Screening Information to Protect Against Terrorism (Sep. 16, 2003); WILLIAM J. KROUSE & BART ELIAS, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., TERRORIST WATCHLIST CHECKS AND AIR PASSENGER PRESCREENING (2009);
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., ROLE OF THE NO FLY AND SELECTEE
LISTS IN SECURING COMMERCIAL AVIATION (REDACTED) 9–16 (2009); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FOLLOW-UP AUDIT OF THE TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER 3–6
(2007); Jennifer C. Daskal, Pre-Crime Restraints: The Explosion of Targeted, Noncustodial Prevention, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 344–48 (2014); Peter Shane, The Bureaucratic Due Process of
Government Watch Lists, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 804, 811–19 (2007). While the government had
long resisted disclosing its criteria for adding individuals to the TSDB, an intelligence community
source disclosed those guidelines to journalists in 2014. Jeremy Scahill & Ryan Devereaux,
Blacklisted: The Secret Government Rulebook For Labeling You a Terrorist, INTERCEPT (July 23,
2014), http://interc.pt/1r8CooO.
135. Stumpf, supra note 130.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 18081 (2013); see CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., PRIVACY AND
SECURITY IN THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S DATA HUB (2013); SISKIN & LUNDER, supra note
93, at 10–13; Immigrants and the Affordable Care Act (ACA), NAT’L IMMIGR. LAW CTR. (2014),
http://www.nilc.org/immigrantshcr.html.
137. System of Records Notice, Automated Targeting System, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,297, 30,298
(May 22, 2012); KROUSE & ELIAS, supra note 134, at 8–11.
138. System of Records Notice, Automated Targeting System, 77 Fed. Reg. at 30,298;
KROUSE & ELIAS, supra note 134, at 8–11; Ellen Nakashima, Collecting of Details on Travelers
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For domestic flights, the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening
System (“CAPPS”) operated by the Transportation Security Administration
(“TSA”) performs a similar role. 139
On the other hand, these systems (and others) simultaneously are
intended to perform a second sorting function by facilitating more rapid,
efficient screening and authorization of individuals who are regarded as
presenting comparatively low risks. This second dimension of screening
and authorization seeks to minimize inconvenience to these individuals but
also to permit officials to devote greater attention and resources to those
deemed to present higher risks or more complicated situations. 140 With
massive numbers of people and volumes of goods entering the United
States, and DHS targeting large numbers of noncitizens for investigation
and enforcement within the country, officials regard ensuring efficient
movement by those believed to present low risks as an imperative—in
order, for example, to prevent cross-border traffic from grinding to a halt, as
it did in the days immediately following the 2001 terrorist attacks. 141
Similar kinds of efficiency and risk management concerns arise in postentry enforcement programs.
Accordingly, immigration-related screening and authorization
mechanisms increasingly have been designed with these efficiency- and risk
management-related objectives in mind. For example, DHS has actively
encouraged participation in several registered traveler programs—Global
Entry, NEXUS, SENTRI, FAST, and TSA PreCheck—under which it
collects, maintains, and analyzes detailed information on individuals who
have been prescreened and approved as presenting low risks. Applicants to
these programs must pay an application fee and submit photographs,
fingerprints, and detailed personal information—including current and prior
employment information, current and prior residential addresses, travel
history, criminal history, and immigration history—and must successfully
pass an extensive background check, which includes an in-person interview
and a review of criminal history, customs, immigration, agriculture, and
national security databases. Whether or not applicants are approved, this
information is stored in CBP databases and biometric records are created
for all applicants in IDENT. Once approved, these individuals are deemed
to require more limited scrutiny when entering the United States and are
Documented U.S. Effort More Extensive Than Previously Known, WASH. POST, Sep. 22, 2007, at
A1.
139. KROUSE & ELIAS, supra note 134, at 13–15.
140. Stodder, supra note 130, at 86 (describing ATS as enabling CBP to “identify[] individuals warranting further scrutiny, without creating crippling bottlenecks at the airport” for everyone
else); see SCHNEIER, supra note 113, at 181 (noting that, necessarily, “all security systems need to
allow people in, even as they keep people out”).
141. ALDEN, supra note 46, at 42–48; Stephen E. Flynn, Beyond Border Control, 79 FOREIGN
AFF. 58, 59–62 (2000).
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eligible to enroll in TSA’s PreCheck program, a registered traveler program
for air travelers believed to present limited risks to aviation security. 142
Similarly, at certain ports of entry, CBP has deployed automated
passport control systems that collect, analyze, and store biographic
information, photographs, and travel information from arriving individuals
(currently, only U.S. and Canadian citizens and individuals seeking to enter
the United States under the Visa Waiver Program) using self-service
kiosks—or, in a new pilot program, using smartphone applications—rather
than having CBP inspectors manually collect and process that information
using paper forms. Individuals must then present their passport and a
document generated by the automated system for review by CBP inspectors
before they may be authorized to enter the United States. As with its
registered traveler programs, these new automated systems are intended not
only to facilitate more efficient entry of individuals deemed to present low
risks after their information has been analyzed and processed, but also to
permit officials to identify and sort individuals deemed to present higher
risks, so that officials may devote greater attention and scrutiny to those
individuals. 143
3. Mobility Tracking and Control
The proliferation of settings in which immigration enforcement
activities take place also has given rise to extensive government monitoring
and control over travel and mobility of both noncitizens and U.S. citizens.
In the wake of the 2001 attacks, travel itself has been deemed a source of
potential danger to public safety: in the words of the September 11
Commission, “Targeting travel is at least as powerful a weapon against
terrorists as targeting their money.” 144 Accordingly, the Commission
recommended that border screening systems be integrated into a broader
network of screening systems covering transportation and other sensitive
facilities.145 Government authorities have invested heavily to develop and
142. Trusted Traveler Programs, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/trustedtraveler-programs; see also REY KOSLOWSKI, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., THE EVOLUTION OF
BORDER CONTROLS AS A MECHANISM TO PREVENT ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION, 13–14 (2011).
143. Automated Passport Control (APC), U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION,
http://www.cbp.gov/travel/us-citizens/automated-passport-control-apc; see Gillian Brockwell,
CBP Brings Automated Services to More Than Just Travel Elite, FED. NEWS RADIO (Feb. 5,
2013), http://www.federalnewsradio.com/475/3218839/CBP-brings-automated-services-to-morethan-just-travel-elite; Ben Mutzabaugh, Filling Out Your Customs Forms? There’s an App for
That . . . , USA TODAY (Aug. 12, 2014), http://usat.ly/1orOXxV.
144. 9/11 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 41, at 385; TERRORIST TRAVEL REPORT, supra note
117; see ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 2006: AN INTERNATIONAL
SURVEY OF PRIVACY LAWS AND DEVELOPMENTS (2007) (“Travelers and workers at transportation facilities such as airports have come to be regarded as objects of suspicion, potential terrorists, and targets of surveillance.”).
145. 9/11 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 41, at 387.
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upgrade systems that collect, analyze, store, and disseminate detailed
information about individuals’ mobility and travel plans—both
internationally and domestically, and including both noncitizens and U.S.
citizens. 146 These travel and mobility tracking systems have been
developed within a broader context in which the government’s capacity to
undertake day-to-day location tracking, using GPS systems, cellular
telephone location data, automated license plate readers, and other
mechanisms, has also been significantly enhanced. 147 In combination with
authorization mechanisms that restrict travel for certain individuals, these
systems have enabled a comprehensive regime that accumulates and stores
detailed, permanent records about individual travel histories and patterns,
and enables much individual travel, both international and domestic, only to
take place upon receipt of affirmative, advance government permission. 148
Several information systems enable this regime of mass surveillance
and control of travel and mobility. As discussed below, CBP collects
several categories of personal and travel information from transportation
carriers, computerized reservation systems, other government agencies, and
directly from individual travelers using a variety of mechanisms—
beginning before individuals commence their travel and extending through
completion of the inspection process at the port of entry. This information
is stored within a series of database systems—but even when it does not
store information in its own systems on travel and mobility, DHS has
required transportation carriers to provide real time access to obtain this
information directly from their reservation and departure control systems. 149
In addition, the new e-passports have the technical capacity to include an
archive of the holder’s travel history, although to date this feature has not
been activated for U.S. passports.

146. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-62, BORDER SECURITY: DHS’S
EFFORTS TO MODERNIZE KEY ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS COULD BE STRENGTHENED (2013); see
John Schwartz & Micheline Maynard, Airlines Gave F.B.I. Millions of Records on Travelers After
9/11, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2004, at A1.
147. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Susan
Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70
MD. L. REV. 681 (2011); Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now: Toward Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data That Congress Could
Enact, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117 (2012); Ellen Nakashima & Josh Hicks, DHS Seeks System
to Track Cars’ License Tags, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2014, at A1.
148. Edward Hasbrouck, Government Surveillance and Control of Travelers, Presentation at
Cato Institute, Apr. 2, 2013, available at http://hasbrouck.org/blog/archives/002058.html.
149. Interim Rule, Passenger Name Record Information Required for Passengers on Flights in
Foreign Air Transportation to or from the United States, 67 Fed. Reg. 42710, 42712 (June 25,
2002) (codified at 19 C.F.R. § 122.49d(c)(ii) (2014)) (requiring carriers to provide CBP “with the
necessary airline reservation/departure control systems’ commands” to enable CBP to “[c]onnect
to the carrier’s reservation/departure control systems”); see PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL,
TRANSFERRING PRIVACY: THE TRANSFER OF PASSENGER RECORDS AND THE ABDICATION OF
PRIVACY PROTECTION 2 (2004); Hasbrouck, supra note 148.
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For both noncitizens and U.S. citizens, individuals’ personal and travel
information is stored within ATS and within TECS, a CBP-managed system
that officials describe as “one of the largest, most important law
enforcement systems currently in use,” a “multifaceted computing
platform” that has evolved into a “system of systems.” 150 The system
includes multiple databases that aggregate and store many different
categories of personal information, including:
• Passenger and crew information collected and transmitted by
transportation carriers;
• Border crossing information on close to one billion travelers who
have entered and departed the United States;
• Records on enrolled participants in DHS’s registered traveler
programs;
• State Department records on U.S. citizens who have been issued
passports and other travel documents and on noncitizen visa
applicants (including individuals who have been both issued and
denied visas);
• USCIS records on over fifty-seven million applicants and
petitioners for immigration benefits, including both noncitizens
and U.S. citizens; and
• Information from other government databases, such as those
maintained by state motor vehicle departments, that facilitate
CBP’s identification and admissibility determinations for
noncitizens and U.S. citizens seeking to enter the United States.
CBP officials use TECS when determining whether noncitizens and U.S.
citizens seeking to enter the United States may be admitted. The system
enables travelers’ information to be compared against antiterrorism
watchlists generated by the TSDB, criminal history records in the NCIC,
risk assessments generated by the ATS, and immigration history records
within TECS itself. 151
When individuals enter the United States, records of those border
crossings—including narrative reports containing information that CBP
inspectors deem relevant to their encounters with travelers—are created and
150. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 146, at 3–4. No longer an acronym,
TECS is the successor to the Treasury Enforcement Communications System, which was operated
by the U.S. Customs Service before its functions were transferred the Treasury Department to
DHS in 2003. Id. at 1.
151. System of Records Notice, Border Crossing Information System, 73 Fed. Reg. 43457
(July 25, 2008); DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY OFFICE, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT
FOR THE TECS SYSTEM: CBP PRIMARY AND SECONDARY PROCESSING (2010); DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY OFFICE, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR CBP PROCEDURES FOR
PROCESSING TRAVEL DOCUMENTS AT THE BORDER (2008); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, supra note 146, at 46–47; see ANGWIN, supra note 118, at 92–95; Hasbrouck, supra note
148.

1/14/2015 12:10 PM

2014]

IMMIGRATION SURVEILLANCE

39

maintained in TECS’s Border Crossing Information System (“BCIS”). In
addition, for noncitizens, this travel information also is copied and stored in
TECS’s Arrival and Departure Information System (“ADIS”), which holds
detailed biographic and travel records on over 280 million noncitizens who
have applied for entry, entered, or departed the United States and that are
linked to the biometric records in IDENT. 152 The primary purpose of ADIS
is to monitor and identify temporary nonimmigrants who may have
remained in the United States beyond their periods of authorized stay by
matching records of arrival and departure. 153 However, the system also is
accessed for other immigration control, law enforcement, and national
security purposes. In addition to information collected from individual
travelers and transportation carriers, ADIS also holds information collected
from colleges and universities on noncitizens admitted on student visas.154
4. Information Sharing and Interoperability
Finally, especially in the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks,
information sharing and interoperability of database systems have become
high government priorities—particularly for national security purposes, but
increasingly for other purposes as well.155 Accordingly, both Congress and
the executive branch have directed the development of a variety of systems
and processes to disseminate and share information that might be relevant
for security-related purposes among various actors, including intelligence
agencies, law enforcement, immigration authorities, international entities,
foreign governments, and other institutions, both public and private.156 In
152. SEGHETTI, supra note 49, at 23.
153. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-683, OVERSTAY ENFORCEMENT:
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO ASSESS DHS’S DATA AND IMPROVE PLANNING FOR A
BIOMETRIC AIR EXIT PROGRAM, 12–15 (2013).
154. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY OFFICE, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE
ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE INFORMATION SYSTEM (ADIS) (2007); SEGHETTI, supra note 49, at
23; Systems of Records Notice for Arrival and Departure Information System, 78 Fed. Reg. 31955
(May 28, 2013).
155. 9/11 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 41, at 416–19 (urging information sharing “across
new networks that transcend individual agencies” for national security purposes); see also
MARKLE FOUND’N ON NAT’L SEC., MOBILIZING INFORMATION TO PREVENT TERRORISM (2006);
Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic Intelligence
Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1448 (2011); Peter P. Swire, Privacy and Information Sharing
in the War on Terrorism, 51 VILL. L. REV. 951 (2006).
156. Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 §§ 501–513,
701, 711, 801–804, 1203, 1305, 1410, Pub. No. L. 110-53, 121 Stat. 338 (2007); Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 §§ 1016, 1021–1023, 1061, 6501, 7204, 7210, Pub. L.
No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004); Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 428, Pub. L. 107-296, 116
Stat. 2188–2191 (2002); Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 §§ 201–
204, 603, Pub. L. 107-173, 116 Stat. 543 (2002); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001
§ 414, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); Homeland Security Presidential Directive No.
24, Biometrics for Identification and Screening, ¶ 11 (June 5, 2008).
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some instances, these efforts have involved the creation of new institutional
forms altogether, such as the “fusion centers” authorized by Congress to
“co-locate” federal, state, and local officials together to work
collaboratively, along with private contractors, on the collection and
analysis of intelligence concerning a broad array of potential threats.157 In
many other instances, they have involved efforts to make government
databases interoperable and more widely accessible across agency lines.
This emphasis on interoperability in immigration governance has been
particularly great as the federal institutions involved in immigration
regulation have become more fragmented. With the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security, most immigration policy functions were
transferred from a single agency within the Department of Justice (the INS)
to multiple agencies within DHS (USCIS, CBP, and ICE)—even as other
immigration-related functions have remained vested within the Department
of Justice, Department of State, Department of Health and Human Services,
and Department of Labor. Moreover, as immigration control activities have
proliferated in a variety of new state, local, and private institutions, and the
overall scale of enforcement has skyrocketed, the number of public and
private actors performing immigration enforcement functions has grown
exponentially. In this context, the post-2001 emphasis on information
sharing for national security purposes has also given a boost to initiatives to
make the technological systems used for immigration control by different
agencies interoperable with each other and more widely accessible to
different actors involved in immigration enforcement. 158
In this context, these interoperability initiatives have not simply
fashioned the “connective tissue” that ties different federal immigration
agencies together with each other. 159 They also integrate those institutions
with the administrative infrastructure of criminal justice, national security
and military defense, employment, transportation, and other federal, state,
local, and private institutions—thereby enabling immigration control and
enforcement institutions to be used for a range of other purposes. For
example, IDENT is now interoperable with the FBI’s Integrated Automated
Fingerprint Identification System (“IAFIS”), which integrates and stores
fingerprints and other personal information collected and submitted by
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and other contributors for
over 100 million subjects and links those fingerprint records to criminal

157. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 155, at 1449–55; Torin Monahan & Priscilla M. Regan,
Zones of Opacity: Data Fusion in Post-9/11 Security Organizations, 27 CAN. J.L. & SOC. 301
(2012).
158. Kalhan, supra note 9, at 1126–27 & n.95 (discussing pre-2001 immigration policing initiatives); see also MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 77–79 (discussing automated employment
eligibility verification pilot programs in the 1990s).
159. MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 65.
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history records in databases across the country. 160 Eventually, both of these
systems will be made fully interoperable with the Department of Defense’s
multimodal biometrics database system, Automated Biometric
Identification System (“ABIS”)—thereby completing the development of
what the Defense Department refers to as the “biometrics triad.” 161
Increasingly, immigration control systems also have become integrated with
private information systems, most notably the computerized reservation
systems and departure control systems of transportation carriers.
B. Immigration Enforcement as Immigration Surveillance
These four sets of migration and mobility surveillance functions—
identification, screening and authorization, mobility tracking and control,
and information sharing—play crucial but underappreciated roles in
immigration control processes across the entire spectrum of migration and
travel. In the growing number of contexts in which immigration control
activities now take place, enforcement actors engage in extensive
collection, storage, analysis, and dissemination of personal information, in
order to identify individuals, screen them and authorize their activities,
enable monitoring and control over their travel, and share information with
other actors who bear immigration control responsibilities. Initially
deployed for traditional immigration enforcement purposes, and expanded
largely in the name of security, these surveillance technologies and
processes are qualitatively remaking the nature of immigration governance,
as a number of examples illustrate.
1. Border Control
Despite implementation challenges, Congress and DHS have placed
new surveillance technologies at the heart of border control strategies.162
Physical barriers along the U.S.-Mexico border have been supplemented
with advanced lighting, motion sensors, remote cameras, and mobile
surveillance systems, and DHS has deployed a fleet of unmanned aerial

160. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY OFFICE, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE
AUTOMATED BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (IDENT) 11–15 (2012); Integrated Automated
Fingerprint Identification System, FED. BUREAU INVEST., http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/iafis/iafis.
161. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, BIOMETRICS IDENTITY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, ANNUAL
REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 18–21 (2012); see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO11-276, DEFENSE BIOMETRICS: DOD CAN BETTER CONFORM TO STANDARDS AND SHARE
BIOMETRIC INFORMATION WITH FEDERAL AGENCIES 18–26 (2011); see also BIOMETRICS IN
GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 120, at 24–27; Donohue, supra note 118, at 457–59.
162. CHAD C. HADDAL, YULE KIM & MICHAEL GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BORDER
SECURITY: BARRIERS ALONG THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL BORDER (2009).

42

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 74:1

vehicles to monitor coastal areas and land borders.163 To date, these drones
primarily have been used to locate illegal border crossers and individuals
suspected of drug trafficking in remote areas using ultra high-resolution
cameras, thermal detection sensors, and other surveillance technologies.164
However, drones also have been used to patrol and monitor activities within
Mexico itself. 165 In addition, government documents indicate that DHS’s
drones are capable of intercepting wireless communications and may
eventually incorporate facial recognition technology linked to the agency’s
identification databases.166 According to one official, CBP’s drones can
“scan large swaths of land from 20,000 feet up in the air while still being
able to zoom in so close that footprints can be seen on the ground.” 167 The
DHS has plans both to expand its fleet of drones and to increase their
surveillance capabilities, and immigration reform proposals in Congress
would significantly build upon these recent expansions. 168
2. Overseas Visa Issuance and Refugee Processing
In 2001, Congress mandated the State Department to conduct
biometric screening for all visa applications, and by 2004, diplomatic posts
worldwide were collecting fingerprints from all visa applicants along with
photographs, biographic information, background information, and other
personal details. 169 The State Department maintains records on all visa
applications, including both issuances and denials, in its Consular
Consolidated Database (“CCD”), which holds biometric and biographic
163. Rey Koslowski, Immigration Reforms and Border Security Technologies, BORDER
BATTLES (July 31, 2006), http://borderbattles.ssrc.org/Koslowski; Greg Beato, Big Brother’s Border Blindness, REASON, Dec. 2012, at 16; ANDREAS, supra note 24, at 91–92; ROSENBLUM, supra
note 30, at 16–19.
164. CHAD C. HADDAL & JEREMIAH GERTLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HOMELAND
SECURITY: UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND BORDER SURVEILLANCE (2010); DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., CBP’S USE OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
IN THE NATION’S BORDER SECURITY (2012).
165. Ginger Thompson & Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Drones Fly Deep in Mexico to Fight Drugs,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16 2011, at A1.
166. Declan McCullagh, DHS Built Domestic Surveillance Tech into Predator Drones, CNET
(Mar. 2, 2013), http://cnet.co/ZaD4fa; ACLU, PROTECTING PRIVACY FROM AERIAL
SURVEILLANCE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT USE OF DRONE AIRCRAFT (2011).
167. Hernán Rozemberg, Homeland Security Expands Use of Drones on the Border,
FRONTERAS (Jul. 3, 2012), http://www.fronterasdesk.org/content/homeland-security-expands-usedrones-border.
168. M. Ryan Calo, The Drone as Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 29, 30 (2011);
Jill Replogle, In Border Security Quest, A Call for More Drones, FRONTERAS (Feb. 11, 2013),
http://www.fronterasdesk.org/content/border-security-quest-call-more-drones.
169. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 § 403(c), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001); BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 119, at 44–46; U.S. DEP’T
OF STATE, PRIVACY COORDINATOR, CONSULAR CONSOLIDATED DATABASE (CCD): PRIVACY
IMPACT ASSESSMENT (2010).

1/14/2015 12:10 PM

2014]

IMMIGRATION SURVEILLANCE

43

records on over 100 million visa cases and grows at a rate of approximately
35,000 visa cases per day. 170 The CCD also holds records on all applicants
for U.S. passports and other U.S. citizen services. Through CCD, consular
officials run name checks on applicants against the Consular Lookout and
Support System (“CLASS”)—a State Department database containing over
twenty-six million records collected from individual applicants and the
databases of numerous other government agencies—in order to identify
individuals who may be ineligible for visa issuance or warrant special
handling. 171 Now, CCD is also interoperable with DHS’s IDENT and the
FBI’s IAFIS systems, which enables consular officials to share visa
information and run biometric checks against records in those databases,
and with ATS. 172 At some diplomatic posts, consular officials have access
to ADIS, which enables them to determine whether applicants have
previously “overstayed” while in the United States. Additional screening is
conducted by DHS agents assigned to certain diplomatic posts, who have
access to TECS and other databases and who conduct more in-depth
analysis and investigation of applicants as necessary. With the deployment
of new technologies that permit remote review of visa applications by
personnel in the United States, this additional layer of DHS review is being
extended to all visa applications worldwide.173
Overseas processing of refugees also now involves an intensive
process of information collection, screening, and dissemination, including
biographic and biometric background checks against the databases of
multiple government agencies. 174 In a recent pilot program, the State
Department collected and tested DNA from African refugees seeking to
reunite with relatives in the United States in order to detect fraudulent
family reunification claims. As a result of that pilot program, the State
Department suspended its refugee family reunification program in certain
parts of Africa, and when it resumed that program in 2012, the State

170. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 169.
171. Id.
172. BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 120, at 44–46; U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, supra note 169.
173. RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., VISA SECURITY POLICY: ROLES OF THE
DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND HOMELAND SECURITY 7 (2011); DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
PRIVACY OFFICE, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE VISA SECURITY PROGRAM TRACKING
SYSTEM—NETWORK VERSION 2.0 (2013).
174. See Terrorist Exploitation of Refugee Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 112th Cong. 11–12 (2012)
(prepared statement of Barbara L. Strack, Chief, Refugee Affairs Division, U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services); Achraf Farraj, Refugees and the Biometric Future: The Impact of Biometrics on Refugees and Asylum Seekers, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 891 (2011).
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Department instituted rules that made DNA testing mandatory to establish
the legitimacy of certain claimed family relationships.175
3. Entry, Exit, and Travel Control
CBP and TSA collect, analyze, store, and disseminate large quantities
of detailed personal information and travel history about both noncitizens
and U.S. citizens arriving in or departing from the United States by air or
sea before they commence their travel. More recently, this same basic
system has been extended to domestic travel by air within the United States,
thereby integrating the surveillance and tracking mechanisms for both
domestic and international travel. As a result of these systems, much travel
now only can take place after carriers receive affirmative, advance
government permission to permit individuals to travel—without travelers
themselves necessarily being made fully aware of the need for that
permission—and is accompanied by collection, aggregation, and storage of
detailed personal information and travel histories for millions of noncitizens
and U.S. citizens.
The information collected consists of several categories of overlapping
but distinct data. First, noncitizen visitors seeking to enter the United States
by air or sea without visas, under the Visa Waiver Program, must apply
online for authorization before commencing their travel. These individuals
are required to submit biographic and travel information and to answer
questions concerning their eligibility using the Electronic System for Travel
Authorization (“ESTA”), and carriers must verify compliance before
permitting them to board. ESTA shares this information with the National
Counterterrorism Center and automatically screens this information against
antiterrorism, immigration control, and criminal law enforcement databases,
using ATS and other TECS databases, to determine whether these would-be
visitors present threats to aviation security or national security, are of
interest to law enforcement, or may be inadmissible for some other reason.
Like visas, travel authorizations under ESTA, which are valid for two years,
do not establish or guarantee admissibility, and by the same token,
individuals who have been denied authorization are directed to U.S.
diplomatic posts where consular official may issue visas to those
individuals or otherwise resolve the issue. 176
175. ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REFUGEE ADMISSIONS AND
RESETTLEMENT POLICY 5–6 (2014); Emily Holland, Moving the Virtual Border to the Cellular
Level: Mandatory DNA Testing and the U.S. Refugee Family Reunification Program, 99 CALIF. L.
REV. 1635 (2011); see also JILL ESBENSHADE, IMMIGR. POL’Y CTR., AN ASSESSMENT OF DNA
TESTING FOR AFRICAN REFUGEES, 4 (2010) (analyzing pilot program and raising concerns that
“DNA testing in the refugee context may portend required DNA testing in other areas of immigration admissions”).
176. 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(9)–(11), (g), (h)(3) (2013); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-11-335, VISA WAIVER PROGRAM: DHS HAS IMPLEMENTED THE ELECTRONIC SYSTEM FOR
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Second, as discussed above, Congress has required air and sea carriers
traveling to and from the United States to transmit all passenger and crew
manifest information to U.S. officials before departure, including both
noncitizens’ and U.S. citizens’ information. Non-U.S.-based air carriers
must also submit this information for flights within or overflying the United
States. 177 This advance passenger information (“API”) consists of basic
personal information collected from the traveler’s passport and other travel
documents but also includes information collected from the carrier’s own
reservations and departure control systems, such as flight or vessel details.
API data also includes information collected directly from travelers at
check-in, including information on the individual’s travel and U.S.
destination. 178 Noncitizen travelers who decline to provide this information
may be inadmissible, and U.S. citizens who decline to provide this
information may be prohibited from traveling by the carrier or subjected to
greater scrutiny upon arrival in the United States.179
Through its Advance Passenger Information System (“APIS”), CBP
begins receiving this information in batches as early as seventy-two hours
prior to departure and analyzes and compares this information in real time
against information in the No Fly and Selectee watchlists generated by the
TSDB. When this review is complete, CBP either clears the carrier to issue
a boarding pass, instructs the carrier to conduct additional security
screening, or directs the carrier not to issue a boarding pass. 180 As
discussed above, CBP also stores this information in the BCIS and ADIS

TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION, BUT FURTHER STEPS NEEDED TO ADDRESS POTENTIAL PROGRAM
RISKS (2011); DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY OFFICE, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR
THE ELECTRONIC SYSTEM FOR TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION (ESTA) (2008); see also Statement by
Secretary Johnson on Security Enhancements to the Visa Waiver Program, DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC. (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/11/03/statement-secretary-johnson-securityenhancements-visa-waiver-program (discussing expansion of biographic and travel information
required to be submitted via ESTA). As with individuals who have been issued visas, border inspectors are authorized to make their own, de novo determinations as to whether individuals seeking to enter the United States under the Visa Waiver Program are admissible. 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1187(a), 1201(h), 1235(a).
177. 49 U.S.C. § 44909(c)(1)–(2) (2013); Final Rule, Advance Electronic Transmission of
Passenger and Crew Manifests for Commercial Aircraft and Vessels, 72 Fed. Reg. 48,320 (Aug.
23, 2007). These advance passenger information sharing requirements also have been extended to
private air carriers, and similar information sharing protocols also have been implemented on a
voluntary basis with Amtrak and certain private bus carriers. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
PRIVACY OFFICE, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE ADVANCE PASSENGER INFORMATION
SYSTEM (APIS) (2008); DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY OFFICE, PRIVACY IMPACT
ASSESSMENT FOR THE ADVANCED PASSENGER INFORMATION SYSTEM—VOLUNTARY RAIL AND
BUS SUBMISSIONS (APIS-VRBS) (2008).
178. KROUSE & ELIAS, supra note 134, at 25.
179. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY OFFICE, supra note 47.
180. 19 C.F.R. § 122.49a(b)(1)(ii) (2014); see Final Rule, Advance Electronic Transmission of
Passenger and Crew Manifests for Commercial Aircraft and Vessels, 72 Fed. Reg. at 48323–24 .
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databases within TECS and compares it against other government databases
to facilitate customs and immigration clearance upon arrival.
Third, Congress and DHS have required international air and sea
carriers to transmit passenger name record (“PNR”) data to U.S. officials
prior to departure to or from the United States, and to give U.S. officials the
ability to also access this information directly from airlines’ reservation and
departure control systems. 181 PNR data overlaps with but is broader than
API data. Depending on the particular configuration of the carrier’s
reservations and departure control systems, PNR data can include not only
the traveler’s biographic data, contact information, and basic travel data, but
also detailed information on the individual’s travel, including the full
itinerary for the trip, transactional details about the reservation (including
notations of all changes), payment and billing details, frequent flier
program information, baggage and seat information, information about
travel companions and other parts of the individual’s trip, and comments by
reservation systems or travel agents on special issues or requests (such as
special meal requests or particular medical needs). 182 CBP stores PNR data
in ATS and, as discussed above, compares and analyzes this information
against a broad array of government databases in order to assess terrorismrelated risks the traveler is deemed to present.183
Finally, under TSA’s “Secure Flight” program, airlines must send TSA
basic biographic information, referred to as “Secure Flight Passenger Data”
(“SFPD”), for all passengers traveling by air—including international
flights that arrive in, depart from, or overfly the United States and domestic
flights within the United States. While overlapping in some respects, the
data collection process for Secure Flight differs from CBP’s API and PNR
data collection processes in both timing and content. When passengers
make flight reservations, carriers must request basic biographic information
from them as it appears on an approved identification document. Then,
seventy-two hours before the scheduled departure time (or at the time of the
reservation, for reservations made within seventy-two hours of departure),
the carrier must transmit this information to TSA via APIS along with other
information in the airline’s reservation systems, including itinerary details,
PNR record locator, and, if already available to the airline, the traveler’s

181. 49 U.S.C. § 44909(c)(3) (2013); Interim Rule, Passenger Name Record Information Required for Passengers on Flights in Foreign Air Transportation to or from the United States, 67
Fed. Reg. 42,710, 42,712 (June 25, 2002) (codified at 19 C.F.R. § 122.49d (2014)).
182. EDWARD HASBROUCK, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT PNR DATA (2012),
http://hasbrouck.org/IDP/EU-PNR-FAQ.pdf; Edward Hasbrouck, What’s in a Passenger Name
Record (PNR)?, THE PRACTICAL NOMAD, http://hasbrouck.org/articles/PNR.html; see also
KROUSE & ELIAS, supra note 134, at 26.
183. KROUSE & ELIAS, supra note 134, at 9–11.
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passport information. 184 CBP (for international flights) or TSA (for
domestic flights) then compares and analyzes that information against the
No Fly and Selectee Lists generated by the TSDB. As with the API process,
the airline is either cleared to issue a boarding pass, instructed to conduct
additional security screening, or directed not to issue a boarding pass. 185
When flights and vessels arrive in the United States, CBP inspectors
compare the information in the arriving passengers’ travel documents with
the API data transmitted prior to departure and a series of other government
databases. Officials now also collect biometric data at almost all ports of
entry from most categories of noncitizens arriving in the United States,
including virtually all individuals arriving by air or sea and many
individuals arriving by land. 186 As discussed above, records of all border
crossings are recorded in the BCIS database within TECS and, for
noncitizens, within ADIS.
4. Post-Entry Enforcement
With both direct and indirect immigration enforcement activities
increasingly taking place after individuals have entered the United States, as
discussed in Part I, surveillance processes and technologies that enable
collection, processing, storage, and dissemination of personal information
have also proliferated to facilitate those enforcement activities. 187 A
number of examples illustrate these developments:
Monitoring and Registration. The NSEERS program initiated in the
aftermath of the 2001 attacks, which is discussed above, required Arab and
Muslim nonimmigrant men (1) to be fingerprinted and photographed upon
arrival in the United States (or to appear for registration if already in the
United States), (2) if they remained in the country longer than thirty days, to
periodically report for in-person interviews, and (3) to register again when
departing the United States. 188 Biometric identifiers collected from these
individuals have been enrolled in IDENT, and other personal information
and narrative reports of NSEERS interviews—and of the “voluntary”
interviews conducted by the FBI have been stored in other government
databases. 189 By the end of 2003, officials had collected information on
approximately 83,000 registrants, leading to the deportation of almost
184. Final Rule, Secure Flight Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,018 (Oct. 28, 2008); Secure Flight:
Frequently Asked Questions, IDENTITY PROJECT, http://papersplease.org/sf_faq.html.
185. Final Rule, Secure Flight Program, 73 Fed. Reg. at 64,019.
186. Final Rule, Enrollment of Additional Aliens in US-VISIT, 73 Fed. Reg. 77,473 (Dec. 19,
2008); SEGHETTI, supra note 49, at 23–24.
187. See supra Parts I.B–C.
188. RIGHTS WORKING GROUP, supra note 71, at 15–16.
189. CHISHTI ET AL., supra note 70, at 18–19, 41; DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN., INFORMATION SHARING ON FOREIGN NATIONALS: BORDER SECURITY
(REDACTED) 4–6, 9–11 (2012).
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14,000 individuals. 190 When the Obama Administration partially suspended
NSEERS in 2011, it already had been partially superseded by more general
entry-exit tracking mechanisms, but the Administration did not terminate
the program altogether or foreclose its future use. Information collected
under NSEERS continues to be maintained and used by DHS—for
example, by CBP’s Automated Targeting System when making its
automated risk assessments. 191
Congress also has mandated more extensive ongoing monitoring of
international students and exchange visitors, requiring educational
institutions to share enrollment status and other personal information on
these individuals and their dependents with DHS and expanding the FBI’s
ability to obtain student records that otherwise would be protected from
disclosure. 192 To implement these mandates, DHS has developed the
Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (“SEVIS”), a database
system through which schools must regularly report personal information
about international students—including their enrollment status, class
attendance, changes in majors, disciplinary action, or early graduation—and
their dependents. 193 DHS officials use SEVIS not only to monitor and
identify international students who may have fallen out of lawful
nonimmigrant status but also to “identify patterns of criminal activity,
including terrorism” and to “identify trends and patterns to assist in
planning and analyzing risks.” 194
Immigration Policing. Interoperable databases now play a powerful
role in federal programs to enlist state and local law enforcement and
corrections officers in the identification of potentially deportable
noncitizens by enabling automatic, routine, and effectively mandatory
190. RIGHTS WORKING GROUP, supra note 71, at 26–29. While NSEERS remained active
until April 2011 and continues to have a number of residual effects, no authoritative data is available concerning the number of individuals affected since 2003. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Business as Usual: Immigration and the National Security Exception, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1485,
1507–08 (2010).
191. System of Records Notice for Automated Targeting System, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,297,
30297–303 (May 22, 2012); Removing Designated Countries From NSEERS, 76 Fed. Reg.
23,830, 23,830–01 (Apr. 28, 2011); RIGHTS WORKING GROUP, supra note 71.
192. Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act §§ 501–502, Pub. L. No. 107-153,
116 Stat. 543 (2002); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of 2001 §§ 416, 507, Pub. L. No.
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
§ 641, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
193. Romero, supra note 68; see also ALISON SISKIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MONITORING
FOREIGN STUDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE STUDENT AND EXCHANGE VISITOR
INFORMATION SYSTEM (SEVIS) (2005).
194. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-690, PERFORMANCE OF INFORMATION
SYSTEM TO MONITOR FOREIGN STUDENTS AND EXCHANGE VISITORS HAS IMPROVED, BUT
ISSUES REMAIN 67 (2004); see also SHANNON R. ANDERSON, BILL OF RIGHTS DEFENSE COMM.,
TOTAL INFORMATION AWARENESS AND BEYOND: THE DANGERS OF USING DATA MINING
TECHNOLOGY TO PREVENT TERRORISM 7–8 (2004).
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immigration status determinations by these officers in the course of their
day-to-day responsibilities. Under DHS’s “Secure Communities” program,
fingerprints that are recorded and transmitted to the FBI’s IAFIS database
(to obtain identification and criminal history information as part of the
typical post-arrest booking process) are now simultaneously transmitted to
DHS for comparison against records in IDENT. If the fingerprints match a
record in IDENT—or even if there is no match, but the individual has an
unknown or non-U.S. place of birth—the system automatically flags the
record for further review. Based on enforcement priorities and other
factors, ICE may decide to initiate removal proceedings against the
individual and issue a detainer requesting that the state or local agency hold
the individual for transfer of custody. A second automated immigration
policing program enables automatic identification of suspected immigration
law violators by including automatic searches of civil immigration records
whenever state and local law enforcement officers search the NCIC to
obtain information on criminal history and outstanding warrants on
individuals who they encounter. Both programs have been implemented in
a manner that makes participation effectively mandatory for states and
localities. 195
Immigration Benefits Applications. Just as the State Department does
with individuals applying for visas and refugee status from overseas, DHS,
through USCIS, collects, stores, analyzes, and disseminates significant
amounts of personal information from individuals affirmatively applying
for parole, adjustment of status, asylum, employment authorization, lawful
permanent resident status, naturalization, and other immigration benefits
within the United States. USCIS maintains and tracks benefits applications
using its Central Index System, which is able to access over fifty-seven
million records concerning the individuals who have applied for these
immigration benefits in a variety of different case management database
systems. 196 Collection of fingerprints from immigration benefits applicants
has become routine, and serious consideration has been given to routine
collection of other biometric data, most notably DNA. 197 Officials conduct
background checks against a variety of other government databases. 198
USCIS has even used social networking platforms to conduct surveillance
on individuals seeking to naturalize. The agency has instructed its officials
195. Kalhan, supra note 9, at 1122–31. That said, in practice the precise manner in which that
local participation takes place still can vary significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Id. at
1153–54, 1159–62; see generally Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis
of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126 (2013).
196. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY OFFICE, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE
CENTRAL INDEX SYSTEM (2007); see MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 71–72.
197. LYNCH, supra note 113, at 6–8.
198. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY OFFICE, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE
IMMIGRATION BENEFITS BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM 2–4 (2010).
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to “friend” petitioners for naturalization and their beneficiaries on social
networks in an apparent effort to detect potential grounds upon which those
petitions might be denied, such as the failure to meet the legal standard for a
genuine marriage. 199
Employment Eligibility Verification. The process by which employers
verify whether their new hires are eligible to work in the United States is
undergoing a significant transformation with the implementation of
USCIS’s E-Verify system. Under this pilot program, which was first
authorized and initiated during the 1990s, employers collect personal
information from the identification and work authorization documents that
employees already must present under the existing, paper-based verification
process and submit that information through the online E-Verify system.
The system then attempts to match the individual’s data with records
contained in databases maintained by DHS, the State Department, and the
Social Security Administration (“SSA”) in order to determine whether the
individual is authorized to work in the United States. If the system finds a
match, then the employer is informed that the individual is authorized to
work. If there is no match, or there are discrepancies between the
information submitted and the database records, the system will issue a
“tentative non-confirmation” and direct the employer to refer the employee
to either DHS or SSA to resolve the issue. If the issue is not resolved
within eight days, the employer will be informed that the individual is not
authorized to work. 200
While formally still a pilot program that remains voluntary for most
employers, E-Verify has grown extensively in the past ten years due to a
series of federal, state, and local mandates.
In 2008, the Bush
Administration mandated the system’s use by federal contractors and
subcontractors, and the Obama Administration has maintained the
requirement. 201 In addition, while some states have sought to limit the
system’s use by employers within their jurisdictions, a growing number of
states and localities have mandated its use by various categories of
employers. 202 Leading reform proposals would dramatically extend the
reach of this system—not only by requiring all employers to use E-Verify
199. Jennifer Lynch, Applying for Citizenship? U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Wants to Be
Your “Friend,” EFF DEEPLINKS (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/10/applyingcitizenship-u-s-citizenship-and.
200. ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ELECTRONIC EMPLOYMENT ELIGIBILITY
VERIFICATION 2–3 (2013); DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY OFFICE, PRIVACY IMPACT
ASSESSMENT FOR THE E-VERIFY PROGRAM 6–7 (2010); U.S. CITIZEN. AND IMMIGR. SERVS., EVERIFY USER MANUAL FOR EMPLOYERS (2012); Stumpf, supra note 130.
201. Final Rule, Employment Eligibility Verification, 73 Fed. Reg. 67651 (Nov. 14, 2008).
202. LAWLOGIX, E-VERIFY REQUIREMENTS: FEDERAL, STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL
LEVELS (2013). But see United States v. Illinois, No. 07-3261, 2009 WL 662703 (C.D. Ill. March
12, 2009) (discussing and invalidating as preempted Illinois law prohibiting employers from using
E-Verify until DHS and SSA systems achieve certain accuracy thresholds).
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but also by enhancing the system to incorporate biometric identification
mechanisms and, potentially, by making the employment verification
system interoperable with other database systems. 203
Public Benefits, Services, and Licenses Eligibility Verification.
Somewhat less visibly than some of their other database systems, such as
Secure Communities and E-Verify, federal immigration authorities have
developed the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (“SAVE”)
program, which enables federal, state, and local government agencies to
verify immigration status information for individuals applying for an evergrowing variety of public benefits and services. 204 Now administered and
maintained by USCIS, SAVE was initially authorized by IRCA in 1986 to
enable officials to obtain immigration status information from INS in order
to determine applicants’ eligibility for certain specified federally funded
benefits programs. 205 Since then—with significant expansions in the extent
to which federal, state, and local authorities have restricted eligibility for
services and benefits on the basis of immigration and citizenship status—
the ambit of the SAVE program has been extended to encompass a broader
range of federal, state, and local benefits, services, licenses, grants, and
other programs. 206

203. Border Security, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744,
113th Cong. § 3101(a) (as passed by Senate, June 27, 2013); David Kravets, Biometric Database
of All Adult Americans Hidden in Immigration Reform, WIRED (May 10, 2013),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/05/immigration-reform-dossiers; see Hu, supra note 120,
at 1509–28.
204. IMMIGRATION POL’Y CTR., THE SYSTEMATIC ALIEN VERIFICATION FOR ENTITLEMENTS
(SAVE) PROGRAM: A FACT SHEET (2011).
205. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 121, Pub. L. No. 99–603, 100 Stat. 3359
(1986). The programs for which these immigration status-based eligibility verifications were initially mandated by IRCA included Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Medicaid, Food
Stamps, certain territorial assistance programs administered by the Department of Health and Human Services, the unemployment compensation program administered by the Department of Labor, the Title IV educational assistance program administered by the Department of Education,
and certain housing assistance programs administered by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development. Id.; see U.S. CITIZEN. AND IMMIGR. SERVS., SAVE PROGRAM GUIDE 2–3 (2014);
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY OFFICE, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE
SYSTEMATIC ALIEN VERIFICATION FOR ENTITLEMENTS (SAVE) PROGRAM 12 (2011).
206. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act § 642(c), Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (requiring federal immigration authorities to respond to any inquiries from federal, state, and local agencies “seeking to verify or ascertain the citizenship or
immigration status of any individual within the jurisdiction of the agency for any purpose authorized by law”); Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 §§ 401–
402, 411–413, 431–432, 434, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (establishing mandatory eligibility restrictions and verification requirements for federal public benefits programs on the basis of
immigration and citizenship status and authorizing state governments to adopt alienage-based restrictions and verification requirements for other benefits programs); REAL ID Act of 2005
§ 202(c)(3)(C), Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 302, 302–23 (2005) (requiring states to use
SAVE to verify the immigration status of noncitizens applying for driver’s licenses and stateissued identification cards).
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Over one thousand agencies now access SAVE, including federal,
state, and local benefits agencies and state drivers’ licenses bureaus. SAVE
also is used by agencies that conduct federal security clearances and
background investigations on individuals to verify the immigration status of
those individuals and their family members, cohabitants, and other
affiliates, and by military officials in the course of their recruitment
activities. 207
To implement the large scale eligibility verification
requirements established by the Affordable Care Act, which are discussed
above, federal authorities have integrated SAVE with the systems created
by the Department of Health and Human Services to operate the exchanges
established under the legislation.208
SAVE does not itself furnish any eligibility determinations but rather
provides immigration status information from its systems upon which the
many federal, state, and local agencies requesting that information make
those determinations themselves using their own applicable criteria. Those
agencies collect personal information from applicants and other sources and
transmit that information to SAVE using an online system. As with EVerify, the SAVE system then attempts to match the individual’s data
against a series of government databases that contain over 100 million
records, the majority of which are maintained by agencies other than
USCIS. If the SAVE system identifies a matching record, it provides the
requesting agency with information concerning the individual’s
immigration status. If it does not find a match, SAVE instructs the agency
to take additional steps, in consultation with USCIS officials, to verify the
individual’s immigration status.209 Recent enhancements to SAVE enable
agencies to transmit photographs for comparison against digital
photographs in government databases. 210
Public Health Surveillance.
Public health officials have also
implemented systems to conduct disease surveillance on noncitizens who
have entered the United States. Individuals long have been inadmissible on
certain public health-related grounds, and Congress has required individuals
seeking admission to undergo medical examinations in their countries of
origin before being issued immigrant visas or being admitted as refugees.
Individuals seeking to enter as nonimmigrants can be required to undergo
medical examinations upon arrival at ports of entry. 211 To implement these
207. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY OFFICE, supra note 205 at 18.
208. SISKIN & LUNDER, supra note 93, at 10–11.
209. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY OFFICE, supra note 198, at 2; DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES
SYSTEMATIC ALIEN VERIFICATION FOR ENTITLEMENTS PROGRAM ISSUES 4 (2012).
210. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY OFFICE, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE
FOR THE SYSTEMATIC ALIEN VERIFICATION FOR ENTITLEMENTS (SAVE) PROGRAM 2–3 (2013).
211. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(1), 1201(d) (2013); RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
IMMIGRATION POLICIES AND ISSUES ON HEALTH-RELATED GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION (2011);
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inadmissibility provisions and the statutory obligation to prevent
communicable diseases from being introduced and transmitted within the
United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has
established the Electronic Disease Notification system, which collects and
stores health information on these individuals and transmits that health
information to state and local public health authorities and refugee
resettlement authorities when noncitizens with certain specified health
conditions enter their jurisdictions. 212
Detention and Removal. Finally, both ICE and the Department of
Justice’s Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”), which
supervises the immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals,
maintain systems to collect, store, analyze, and disseminate information
about noncitizens who have been investigated or charged as inadmissible or
deportable, booked and placed in removal proceedings, held in detention or
alternative forms of custody, and removed from the United States. ICE’s
Enforcement Integrated Database (“EID”), which officials access using a
system referred to as ENFORCE, stores this information in several separate
modules. ENFORCE also enables ICE officials to access information in
other database systems, such as the FBI’s NCIC system and DHS’s IDENT
database. 213 A component in ENFORCE also is used to generate automated
risk assessments for individuals when they are booked, which ICE uses to
determine whether and under what kinds of circumstances individuals
should be detained. 214 EOIR maintains case management information in its
Case Access System for EOIR (“CASE”). 215 These systems have facilitated
the significant increases seen in recent years in the number of individuals
detained and removed. For example, enrollment in IDENT has enabled
expanded use of reinstatement of removal. 216

see also Price, supra note 93; Muzaffar Chishti, Faye Hipsman & Sarah Pierce, Ebola Outbreak
Rekindles Debate on Restricting Admissions to the United States on Health Grounds, MIGRATION
INFO. SOURCE (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/ebola-outbreak-rekindlesdebate-restricting-admissions-united-states-health-grounds.
212. Deborah Lee et al., Disease Surveillance Among Newly Arriving Refugees and Immigrants—Electronic Disease Notification System, United States, 2009, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP., Nov. 15, 2013, at 2; see also Wendy K. Mariner, Mission Creep: Public Health Surveillance and Medical Privacy, 87 B.U. L. REV. 347 (2007) (discussing issues arising from use of
database systems for public health and disease surveillance).
213. DONALD KERWIN & SERENA YI-YING LIN, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., IMMIGRATION
DETENTION: CAN ICE MEET ITS LEGAL IMPERATIVES AND CASE MANAGEMENT
RESPONSIBILITIES? 9–10 (2009).
214. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY OFFICE, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE
FOR THE ENFORCEMENT INTEGRATED DATABASE RISK CLASSIFICATION ASSESSMENT,
ENFORCE ALIEN REMOVAL MODULE, AND CRIME ENTRY SCREEN 3–4 (2012).
215. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY OFFICE, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE
OPLA CASE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 25 (2013).
216. ROSENBLUM, supra note 30, at 7 n.45.
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III. LEGALIZATION AND THE IMMIGRATION SURVEILLANCE STATE
These broad expansions in the scope of immigration enforcement,
together with major investments to construct the technological
infrastructure to support those expansions, have given rise to what I
described above as the immigration surveillance state. 217 In its current
incarnation, the immigration surveillance state has most visibly facilitated a
regime of mass detention and deportation. However, as an approach to
governance, immigration surveillance runs much deeper, encompassing a
broader range of activities that both control and facilitate migration and
mobility of both noncitizens and U.S. citizens, both within and outside the
United States. Accordingly, in this Part, I explain why comprehensive
immigration reform and other legalization proposals, while holding the
potential to drastically reduce the number of noncitizens subject to removal
from the United States, are not only unlikely to slow or reverse the
development of the immigration surveillance state but, to the contrary, are
likely to consolidate and extend its reach.218
To begin with, comprehensive approaches to immigration reform
conventionally have been understood to entail a pairing between two sets of
objectives: regularization of current undocumented immigrants and
increased future immigrant and nonimmigrant flows, on the one hand, along
with increased investments in border control and immigration enforcement,
on the other. 219 Accordingly, like IRCA’s legalization provisions in 1986,
the past decade’s leading comprehensive reform proposals—from the Bush
Administration’s reform principles in 2004, to the bills passed by the Senate
in 2006 and 2013, to the Obama Administration’s reform principles in
2013, to the reform principles briefly floated by House Republicans in
January 2014—all forcefully pledge major investments to expand
immigration enforcement activities across all of the many domains in which
they now take place, including further investments in the new technologies
used to fashion the immigration surveillance state.
However, legalization also reinforces immigration surveillance at an
even more basic level. Like other aspects of immigration governance,
217. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
218. Cf. Martin, supra note 3, at 526 (arguing that the “one truly indispensable component of
viable immigration reform must be steps that will steadily build a stable, during, and functional
enforcement system”).
219. MARY GIOVAGNOLI, IMMIGRATION POL’Y CTR., OVERHAULING IMMIGRATION LAW: A
BRIEF HISTORY AND BASIC PRINCIPLES OF REFORM (2013); Sheila Jackson Lee, Why Immigration Reform Requires a Comprehensive Approach That Includes Both Legalization Programs and
Provisions to Secure the Border, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 267 (2006); JEB BUSH & CLINT BOLICK,
IMMIGRATION WARS: FORGING AN AMERICAN SOLUTION (2013). But see KEVIN R. JOHNSON,
OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND
IMMIGRATION LAWS 196–97 (2007) (urging reform that combines more open immigration policies with enforcement and border controls “much narrower than the current restrictionist regime”).
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legalization programs—even if they take the form of straightforward
“amnesty” rather than the more demanding “earned legalization” that
today’s leading proposals contemplate—necessarily require identification,
screening, and authorization of individuals to determine whether they meet
certain eligibility criteria and to formally confer the legal status that they
seek.
For example, IRCA’s legalization program—which granted
permanent residence to individuals meeting the relatively straightforward
criteria of having resided in the United States before a specified cutoff date
or having performed agricultural work for at least ninety days during the
prior year—required applicants to provide documentation establishing their
identity, residence, financial responsibility, and proof of employment; to be
fingerprinted and photographed; and to appear for an in-person interview. 220
The “earned legalization” approaches contemplated by today’s
comprehensive reform proposals are considerably more complex, involving
stringent initial eligibility criteria and long probationary periods during
which applicants must satisfy a series of continuing obligations to “earn”
legal status. 221 For example, under the initial eligibility criteria in the
Senate’s 2013 reform bill, applicants not only must satisfy a durational
residence requirement but also must not have convictions for specified
offenses; pay an application fee, a penalty, and any back taxes; submit
biometric and biographic data; and successfully complete national security,
criminal law, and immigration background checks. After extended periods
of time in this provisional status, individuals may adjust to permanent
resident status if they continue to satisfy the initial eligibility criteria,
successfully complete a second set of background checks, and meet a series
of additional prospective criteria, such as obtaining employment, satisfying
minimum income requirements, remaining continuously physically present
in the United States, registering for the military draft, meeting English
language proficiency and civics knowledge requirements, and others.222
To implement and monitor compliance with these requirements,
authorities invariably will turn to the techniques and technologies of
immigration surveillance—collecting, storing, analyzing, and disseminating
vast quantities of information on millions of eligible noncitizens, on an
ongoing basis, to identify and ascertain who qualifies for legalization and,
ultimately, for adjustment to lawful permanent resident status. In a world in
which the availability of more information is almost always assumed to be
better, the likelihood of long retention periods and secondary use of that
220. See HING, supra note 24, at 166–70 (discussing IRCA’s legalization program and its implementation).
221. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE ON U.S.
IMMIGRATION POLICY 77–78 (2009); cf. Ayelet Shachar, Earned Citizenship: Property Lessons
for Immigration Reform, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 110, 140–41 (2011).
222. Border Security, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744,
113th Cong. §§ 2101, 2102, 2211, 2212 (as passed by Senate, June 27, 2013).
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data for purposes not contemplated at the time of collection is quite high. 223
By definition, not every unauthorized migrant will be able to regularize his
or her status. Those who ultimately fall short of these requirements and
remain undocumented—an enduring population that, as Michael Wishnie
describes, will effectively become “super-undocumented,” even more
deeply in the shadows than current undocumented immigrants—will
continue to face the entire spectrum of enforcement practices, processes,
and penalties that have emerged in recent decades, if not more aggressive
and intrusive mechanisms of surveillance and control.224
Albeit on a comparatively modest scale, the Obama Administration’s
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) program offers a
glimpse at how immigration reform reinforces the immigration surveillance
state. 225 Strictly speaking, DACA involves a categorical but temporary
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, but the “DACAmented” status it
confers should be understood as a form of quasi-legalization.226 The
program permits unlawfully present noncitizens under the age of thirty-one
to request a renewable, two-year period of temporary relief from
deportation and employment authorization if they arrived in the United
States while below age sixteen; have continuously resided in the United
States since June 15, 2007; are currently enrolled in school, graduated from
high school or a GED program, or received an honorable U.S. military
discharge; have not been convicted of certain specified criminal offenses;
and do not otherwise present any threat to national security or public
safety. 227
DACA applicants must submit documentation to USCIS establishing
their identity and fulfillment of these eligibility criteria. In addition, USCIS
collects detailed biographic information and biometrics (photographs,
fingerprints, and signatures) from all applicants in order to conduct criminal
history and national security background checks against FBI’s IAFIS,
DHS’s TECS, and other government databases, and to enroll individuals
223. See Danielle Keats Citron & David Gray, Addressing the Harm of Total Surveillance: A
Reply to Professor Neil Richards, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 262, 262 (2013) (“The ethos of our age is
‘the more data, the better.’”).
224. Michael J. Wishnie, Labor Law After Legalization, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1446, 1458–61
(2008).
225. See Koh, supra note 130, at 1846–51 (describing the “inherently tenuous nature” of the
status conferred by DACA).
226. ROBERTO G. GONZALES & VERONICA TERRIQUEZ, IMMIGRATION POL’Y CTR., HOW
DACA IS IMPACTING THE LIVES OF THOSE WHO ARE NOW DACAMENTED: PRELIMINARY
FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL UNDACAMENTED RESEARCH PROJECT (2013); The Top Ten
Benefits Of Being DACA-Mented!, UNITED WE DREAM, http://unitedwedream.org/daca-top10/.
227. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland Security, to David V.
Aguilar, Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 15,
2012); see Lauren Gilbert, Obama’s Ruby Slippers: Enforcement Discretion in the Absence of
Immigration Reform, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 255 (2013).
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into IDENT if their biometric records are not already included.228 Experts
have estimated that as many as 1.8 million individuals could be eligible for
DACA, and as of March 2014, over 673,000 DACA applications had been
received. 229
Whether as part of comprehensive immigration reform or in some
other incarnation, any legalization program that Congress ultimately might
adopt would invariably require—on a much larger scale—similar processes
of data collection, processing, storage, and dissemination of personal
information. 230 While legalization usually is framed in public discourse as
a means of advancing justice, compassion, and human dignity, advocates
and policymakers increasingly characterize legalization as a means of
achieving instrumental objectives closely tied to the logic of immigration
surveillance. For example, some legalization advocates emphasize the
social harms that arise from a large “underground shadow population” and
the benefits legalization would bring by enabling authorities to “learn the
names and addresses of the nation’s inhabitants.” 231 Especially in the wake
of the 2001 attacks, these instrumental arguments are frequently advanced
in the name of national security and public safety:
[T]he security dangers of allowing a large, unauthorized
population to remain are substantial. Effective homeland security
requires that the U.S. government know who is living in this
country to the greatest extent possible. It is simply not safe to
allow so many to live a shadow existence in the country. Efforts
at deportation will only drive such people further underground in
an effort to evade immigration enforcement, when U.S. security
would be better served by making their presence here lawful.232
With these pragmatic concerns front and center, the task of making
unauthorized noncitizens visible and legible to government authorities

228. Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. CITIZEN. AND
IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/childhoodarrivals; DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY
OFFICE, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS
(DACA) 7–8 (2012); DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY OFFICE, supra note 198; DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY OFFICE, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR THE DEFERRED
ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS (DACA) 2–5 (2014).
229. IMMIGRATION POL’Y CTR., WHO AND WHERE THE DREAMERS ARE, REVISED
ESTIMATES (2012); U.S. CITIZEN. AND IMMIGR. SERVS., NUMBER OF I-821D, CONSIDERATION OF
DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS BY FISCAL YEAR, QUARTER, INTAKE,
BIOMETRICS AND CASE STATUS: 2012–2014, SECOND QUARTER (2014).
230. DONALD M. KERWIN & LAUREEN LAGLAGARON, MIGRATION POL’Y INST.,
STRUCTURING AND IMPLEMENTING AN IMMIGRANT LEGALIZATION PROGRAM: REGISTRATION AS
THE FIRST STEP (2010).
231. Stephen H. Legomsky, Portraits of the Undocumented Immigrant: A Dialogue, 44 GA. L.
REV. 65, 101 (2009).
232. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 221, at 79.
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invariably becomes a central objective in any legalization scheme. 233 To
that end, the logic, practices, and institutions of immigration surveillance—
of identification, screening and authorization, mobility tracking and control,
and information sharing—also become critical.
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION SURVEILLANCE
What happens when technology, surveillance, and information are
placed at the heart of immigration governance? In this Part, I identify and
discuss several consequences of this transformation, analyzing immigration
surveillance within the context of a broader set of developments, extending
beyond immigration regulation itself, concerning the role of technology,
surveillance, and information in contemporary governance. First, I highlight the ways in which immigration surveillance has deterritorialized the
national border for migration and mobility purposes, which complicates and
blurs lines of oversight and accountability by dramatically expanding both
the actors conducting immigration control activities and the locations where
those activities take place. Second, I identify and analyze two sets of
concerns arising from these developments that highlight the need for
stronger accountability mechanisms: the risks and fallibilities arising from
automation and the risks that immigration surveillance systems will later be
deployed for secondary purposes not contemplated at the time of
implementation. Across all of the many domains in which immigration
surveillance takes place, these risks increasingly impose the costs of
immigration control upon U.S. citizens and noncitizens with lawful status in
the United States.
A. Deterritorializing the Migration Border
Borders, it is routinely observed, are malleable constructions rather
than fixed realities: “less than definite, permeable, and subject to shifts and
changes.” 234 As such, to speak of “the border” in the context of
immigration governance can be misleading and insufficiently nuanced.
While territorial borders have long played a constitutive role in defining
nation-state sovereignty under international law, like other kinds of
boundaries they can be relevant and important for some purposes but not
for others, and in varying degrees. 235 In some contexts, nonterritorial
233. KERWIN & LAGLAGARON, supra note 230; Bill Ong Hing, Misusing Immigration Policies in the Name of Homeland Security, 6 NEW CENTENNIAL REV. 195, 212–16 (2006); Shachar,
supra note 221, at 157.
234. JOHNSON, supra note 219, at 7–8; see ANDREAS, supra note 24, at 140–42, 151–52;
JULIE MOSTOV, SOFT BORDERS: RETHINKING SOVEREIGNTY AND DEMOCRACY (2008).
235. KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? THE EVOLUTION OF
TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 5 (2009); Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2508–13 (2005).
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demarcations are more consequential than territorial borders.
The
significance and meanings given to both territorial and nonterritorial
boundaries are legally, politically, socially, economically, and culturally
defined, and can evolve and shift over time. 236
The deployment of new technologies and practices of immigration
surveillance has accelerated a long-term process of decoupling the
territorial border of the United States from what I term its migration border:
the set of boundary points at which nation-states authorize individuals to
enter or be admitted, prevent or allow their entry or admission, or subject
them to possible expulsion. 237 Of course, migration borders have never
been fully coextensive with territorial borders as a literal matter. Indeed, a
longstanding cluster of legal fictions treats individuals as being “at the
border” or seeking “entry” when they have been paroled into the United
States or arrive at boundary points that, strictly speaking, are well within
the country’s territorial limits.238 Like other nation-states, the United States
also has long acted extraterritorially to prevent individuals from entering—
for example, by interdicting and turning away would-be migrants while
they are still traveling to the United States through international waters. 239
Migration boundary points also typically exist within broader zones that often are treated as roughly equivalent, in varying degrees, to the actual
boundary points themselves. 240 Nevertheless, a powerful and commonplace
narrative assumes that migration borders are and should be coextensive
with territorial borders—as reflected in the very fact that the doctrinal
principles that comprise entry-related legal fictions are understood as

236. ANDREAS, supra note 24, at 152; SASSEN, supra note 17.
237. See Saskia Sassen, Bordering Capabilities Versus Borders: Implications for National
Borders, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 567, 568 (2009) (“[T]raditional borders now coexist with a variety
of other bordering dynamics and capabilities.”); see also ELSPETH GUILD, SECURITY AND
MIGRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2009); SASSEN, supra note 17, at 222–76; Ayelet Shachar,
The Shifting Border of Immigration Regulation, 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 165 (2007).
238. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272–73 (1973) (deeming
searches of passengers and cargo upon arrival at an inland international airport to occur at the
“functional equivalent” of the border for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis); United States
v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616–19 (1977) (same); Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187–190
(1958) (deeming arriving noncitizen who has been temporarily paroled into the United States to
continue to hold the legal status of an individual “on the threshold of initial entry”); Shaughnessy
v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213–15 (1953) (deeming noncitizen to be at the border when seeking entry upon arrival and during subsequent harborage at Ellis Island); Laura J.
Arandes, Life Without Parole: An Immigration Framework Applied to Potentially Indefinite Detention at Guantanamo Bay, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1046, 1049–62 (2011) (discussing legal significance of “admission,” “entry,” and “parole” under immigration law).
239. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 158–59 (1993).
240. E.g., Brian Palmer, What’s Life Like in an Airport Transit Zone?, SLATE (July 2, 2013),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2013/07/edward_snowden_has_spent_
a_week_in_a_transit_zone_at_moscow_s_airport_what.html; see Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous
Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1229–31 (1996).
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“fictions” in the first place rather than simply as doctrinal nuances or
complexities.
However, in combination with immense expansions of immigration
enforcement activities, immigration surveillance has hastened the
detachment of migration borders from territorial borders. On the one hand,
the changes in rules and practices for use of drones along the U.S.-Mexico
border, visa issuance, the Visa Waiver Program, preinspection and
screening of travelers outside the United States, and pre-departure
collection and analysis of travelers’ data from international carriers all
seek—self-consciously and by design—to push the migration border
extraterritorially outward.241 This objective long predates the 2001 terrorist
attacks. As volumes of cross-border traffic into the United States became
considerably larger, officials began to implement extraterritorial screening
mechanisms as a means of facilitating more efficient immigration and
customs screening when individuals and goods arrived in the United
States. 242 Since the late 1990s, however, and especially since the 2001
attacks, the expansion of extraterritorial migration and mobility screening
mechanisms increasingly has been justified with reference to antiterrorism,
national security, and public safety-related concerns—as seen in Congress’s
explicit 2004 finding that “[t]he further away from the borders of the United
States that screening occurs, the more security benefits the United States
will gain.” 243 DHS understands its own mission in precisely these terms: to
“push[] our operational borders outward so that our physical borders
become our last line of defense and not our first.” 244
On the other hand, the expansion of both direct and indirect post-entry
enforcement simultaneously draws the migration border inward, selfconsciously constructing virtual, domestic border checkpoints throughout
the country’s interior by identifying “events that are necessary for life in a
modern society” where it may be possible to “exercise control” over
individuals in a manner analogous to the control exercised at the territorial
border. 245 The particular approaches of these post-entry enforcement
241. KOSLOWSKI, supra note 142, at 3.
242. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 38 at 1–6; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/NSIAD-91-6, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: EASING FOREIGN VISITORS’ ARRIVALS AT U.S.
AIRPORTS (1991).
243. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 § 7210(a)(2), Pub. L. No.
108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004). For perspectives predating the 2001 attacks, see U.S.
COMMISSION ON NATIONAL SECURITY/21ST CENTURY, ROAD MAP FOR NATIONAL SECURITY:
IMPERATIVE FOR CHANGE 12–13 (2001); Flynn, supra note 141, at 64.
244. Fact Sheet: DHS’s International Footprint, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/12/02/fact-sheet-dhss-international-footprint (last updated Dec.
12, 2011); see also Gallya Lahav, Mobility and Border Security: The U.S. Aviation System, the
State, and the Rise of Public-Private Partnerships, in POLITICS AT THE AIRPORT 77, 88 (Mark B.
Salter ed., 2008).
245. KRIKORIAN, supra note 86, at 5.
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initiatives vary considerably, and each one involves a distinct set of public
and private actors—including law enforcement and criminal justice
officials, but also welfare agencies, public hospitals and health agencies,
motor vehicle licensing agencies, private employers, private landlords, and
potentially others. Collectively, however, these initiatives establish a kind
of immigration panopticism, which eliminates zones in society where
immigration status is invisible and irrelevant and puts this large array of
public and private actors in the position of identifying individuals and
determining immigration status; collecting, analyzing, and storing personal
information; screening and identifying potential immigration law violators;
and sharing information with federal immigration authorities.246 While
these initiatives increase the likelihood of placing many individuals in
removal proceedings, proponents place even greater emphasis on their
ability to trigger a process they characterize as “self-deportation,” which
disciplines potentially deportable noncitizens into internalizing the
perception that their immigration status is constantly being monitored and,
ultimately, into both revealing their status in a range of day-to-day settings
and conforming to social expectations that they depart the country. 247
Far from being a clear, fixed line that is coextensive with the territorial
border, the picture of the migration border that emerges is a worldwide,
pointillist archipelago of layered boundary points, both fixed and mobile.
New immigration surveillance technologies are what make this
reconfiguration of the migration border possible.
To police this
deterritorialized boundary, federal immigration authorities cooperate and
coordinate with an enormous number of public and private actors—both
within and outside the United States—to collect, analyze, store, and share
biometrics and other personal information, to identify individuals, to
monitor and control mobility, and in some instances to detain individuals or
otherwise restrain their liberty. Interoperable database systems help to
create and make possible these broader assemblages, which “integrate and
coordinate otherwise discrete surveillance regimes” in both “temporary
configurations [and] in more stable structures”—thereby connecting and
integrating the vast array of actors and institutions involved in immigration
governance. 248
246. Kalhan, supra note 9, at 1145; see also Huyen Pham, When Immigration Borders Move,
61 FLA. L. REV. 1115 (2009) supra Part II.A.
247. Kalhan, supra note 9, at 1145; Kalhan, supra note 1, at 1165–67 (discussing “selfdeportation”); see Sonia K. Katyal, The New Surveillance, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 297, 317–20
(2003); Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1948–52
(2013); MARX, supra note 21, at 218–19; MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE
BIRTH OF THE PRISON 200-04 (1977).
248. Kevin D. Haggerty, Foreword to SURVEILLANCE: POWER, PROBLEMS, AND POLITICS ix,
xvii (Sean P. Hier & Joshua Greenberg eds., 2009); Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson, The
Surveillant Assemblage, 51 BRITISH J. SOC. 605, 610–11 (2000); see MEISSNER ET AL., supra note
5, at 65.
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This outward and inward projection of the U.S. migration border
creates significant challenges to ensure transparency and accountability—
particularly as it has been accompanied by the outward and inward
projection of the federal government’s policy objectives, priorities, and
influence into a variety of other lawmaking and governance settings. As the
United States increasingly has emphasized the collection, analysis,
management, and dissemination of information about migrants and
travelers, it has actively cultivated the development of laws, institutions,
and processes—both internationally and domestically—that are conducive
to those immigration surveillance objectives.249
Internationally, for
example, the United States has strongly advocated within international
organizations for the implementation of interoperable global standards for
machine-readable travel documents, e-passports, and computerized
reservations system data formats that facilitate their use in the new
information collection and analysis systems that the United States has
instituted. 250 The expanded collection, storage, and dissemination of API
and PNR data by the United States has led to a series of clashes with the
European Union—whose data protection regime places greater limits on
collection and retention of this data than U.S. law—and ultimately to a
series of E.U.-U.S. agreements that acquiesce to U.S. immigration
surveillance practices.251 Congress also has required countries participating
in the Visa Waiver Program to enter into a series of bilateral agreements to
share information on individuals traveling to the United States, including
antiterrorism watchlists, criminal history records, and lost and stolen
passport information. 252
Domestically, the implementation of surveillance technologies in
connection with the federal expansion of post-entry enforcement has given
rise to a similar dynamic vis-à-vis states and localities. 253 For example,
even as the Obama Administration has proactively sought to restrain states
from unilaterally undertaking some immigration enforcement activities,

249. MAGNET, supra note 120, at 111–12 (“The border has become the latest North American
export.”).
250. INT’L CIV. AVIATION ORG., MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS (MRTDS):
HISTORY, INTEROPERABILITY, AND IMPLEMENTATION (2007); API Guidelines and PNR ReportCIV.
AVIATION
ORG.,
ing
Standards,
INT.
http://www.icao.int/Security/FAL/SitePages/API%20Guidelines%20and%20PNR%20Reporting%
20Standards.aspx; see ACLU, NAKED DATA: HOW THE U.S. IGNORED INTERNATIONAL
CONCERNS AND PUSHED FOR RADIO CHIPS IN PASSPORTS WITHOUT SECURITY (2004); MAGNET,
supra note 120, at 111–12.
251. Francesca Bignami, European Versus American Liberty: A Comparative Privacy Analysis of Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 B.C. L. REV. 609, 610–12 (2007); Ian Hosein, Transforming
Travel and Border Controls: Checkpoints in the Open Society, 22 GOV’T INFO. Q. 594, 599–605
(2005).
252. 8 U.S.C. § 1187(c)(2)(C)–(F) (2012).
253. Kalhan, supra note 9, at 1131.
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such as Arizona’s SB 1070, it simultaneously has implemented automated
immigration policing programs, such as Secure Communities, that
effectively mandate state and local law enforcement collection and
information sharing for immigration control purposes—thereby precluding
states and localities from making affirmative, calibrated, and negotiated
choices about the level of immigration policing assistance they wish to
furnish, which they previously had greater latitude to make. As with
immigration surveillance initiatives that operate extraterritorially, the
technological architecture of these programs shapes the institutional
relationships among different actors involved in immigration governance,
effecting end runs around affirmative state and local choices and
complicating accountability. 254
To speak of the migration border’s detachment from the territorial
border is not to suggest that the territorial border itself has lost significance
for migration and mobility purposes. To the contrary, even as the
expansion of immigration surveillance has broadened the array of boundary
points that comprise the migration border, both extraterritorially and
domestically, the territorial border itself remains a site of ever more
aggressive immigration surveillance and control. As the massive border
fortification investments perenially contemplated by leading immigration
reform proposals indicate, demonstrating “toughness” in policing the
territorial border continues to carry tremendous expressive and symbolic
value for elected officials, quite apart from whether those measures actually
succeed in controlling migration.255
Still, an enormous and growing piece of the immigration control action
is now found elsewhere. It is not simply the case that the migration border
of the United States is “everywhere,” although increasingly it is. 256 In
addition, with the implementation of immigration surveillance
technologies—and the resulting projection of influence by the United States
over lawmaking and governance, both internationally and domestically—a
vast number of actors now contribute to the policing of that migration
border at an effectively limitless number of boundary points around the
world, which creates significant challenges in promoting transparency,
consistency, and accountability among the many actors in that sprawling
transnational network. 257

254. For examples and details, see id. at 1131–33.
255. Border Security, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744,
113th Cong. §§ 1101–1123 (as passed by Senate, June 27, 2013); ANDREAS, supra note 24, at
145–48.
256. David Lyon, The Border Is Everywhere: ID Cards, Surveillance and the Other, in
GLOBAL SURVEILLANCE POLICING 66 (Elia Zureik & Mark Salter eds., 2005).
257. See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 155.
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B. Automating the Migration Border
With the proliferation of interoperable information systems,
monitoring and controlling this deterritorialized migration border has
become increasingly automated and semi-automated. 258
By itself,
automation is by no means inherently or necessarily harmful.259 To the
contrary, at least conceptually automation can help to make government
processes more efficient, effective, or fair. For example, the use of
machine-readable travel documents and the pre-departure collection of
passenger data from international carriers helps to make immigration and
customs screening processes upon arrival in the United States more
efficient—which, as discussed above, was the original reason why U.S.
officials began to collect that information from carriers in the first place.
Defenders of CBP’s use of antiterrorism screening mechanisms such as the
No Fly List, Selectee List, and ATS emphasize the role of these
mechanisms in permitting agency officials to devote scarce resources to
more intensive screening of travelers deemed to present the greatest risks. 260
In some instances, these automated and semi-automated systems seek
to respond directly to concerns arising under their non-automated
predecessors. For example, proponents of E-Verify argue that automated
employment eligibility verification may reduce opportunities for unlawful
discrimination that exist under the existing non-automated employment
verification regime. 261 Similarly, proponents of automated immigration
policing programs such as Secure Communities argue that by seeking to
eliminate discretionary determinations by state and local police concerning
whose immigration status should be investigated and verified, these
programs, at least theoretically, reduce the incidence of errors based on
police officers’ lack of knowledge of immigration law or invidious
exercises of discretion on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin. 262

258. See Citron, supra note 19, at 1263–67 (discussing and categorizing different types of automated systems in government programs).
259. See David Lyon, Introduction, in SURVEILLANCE AS SOCIAL SORTING: PRIVACY, RISK,
AND DIGITAL DISCRIMINATION 1, 2 (David Lyon ed., 2003) (“Surveillance is not itself sinister
any more than discrimination is itself damaging.”).
260. See Stodder, supra note 130, at 86–88 (“[I]n a busy airport, CBP inspectors cannot send
every single person to secondary examination.”).
261. See Stumpf, supra note 130, at 398 (examining evidence that E-Verify may reduce “conscious discrimination against employees based on citizenship status, ethnicity, or national origin”).
262. See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, Delegation in Immigration Law, 79 U. CHI. L. REV.
1285, 1344–46 (2012) (arguing that the Secure Communities program’s “more constrained” delegation “eliminates the need for local officials to have any knowledge about immigration law” and
“almost certainly produce[s] fewer errors” than previous immigration policing initiatives); see
also Anya Bernstein, The Hidden Costs of Terrorist Watch Lists, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 461, 485–86
(2013) (suggesting that automated processes could minimize “biases or other weaknesses in reasoning” and “make it easier to spot the effects of cultural predispositions when they conflict with
realistic assessments”).
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At the same time, automation and semi-automation present significant
risks and concerns of their own. Studies indicate that decisionmaking when
using computerized systems can be distorted by automation complacency
and automation bias, two related phenomena in which individuals place too
much trust in the proper functioning of automated systems even when they
suspect error or malfunction. When these phenomena are at work,
individuals may regard these systems as resistant to error, fail to sufficiently
monitor their operation, or overtrust the answers, recommendations, and
cues they provide. 263 These risks may be exacerbated with large, complex
networks of interoperable information systems like those used for
immigration surveillance, since their proper utilization and maintenance
present distinct challenges. As Erin Murphy describes, government
databases are the “ultimate collaborative projects,” often involving multiple
systems and distributed collection, maintenance, access, analysis, and
exchange of information among many different actors over extended
periods of time. 264
In this context, inadequacies in the quality, accuracy, and relevance of
information contained in the database systems used for immigration
surveillance raise several distinct types of concerns. First, large database
systems invariably contain inaccurate, outdated, or irrelevant records,
particularly as they grow larger and contain greater quantities of
information. Fair information principles emphasize that personal data in
government databases should be accurate, complete, and current.265 For
decades, however, “immigration authorities have been criticized for
maintaining unreliable and inaccurate records and inadequately managing
their information systems.” 266 While some improvements have been made,
these concerns have persisted.
For example, E-Verify regularly issues tentative non-confirmation
notices for a significant number of individuals, including both noncitizens
and U.S. citizens, who in fact are lawfully eligible to work. 267 Similarly, a
263. See Citron, supra note 19, at 1271–72.
264. See Erin Murphy, Databases, Doctrine, and Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 37
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 824–25 (2010) (observing that “database” can be a “misleadingly singular” term, given “layers of individuals and objects” involved in their creation, operation, management, and access, often “span[ning] both geographical and temporal boundaries”); see also Bernstein, supra note 262, at 481 (“[N]etworked information storage has made it easier for information
in one database to be shared with new users, put to new uses, and combined with information from
other sources.”); MARX, supra note 21, at 210–11.
265. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., Doc. C(80)58/FINAL, GUIDELINES
GOVERNING THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA ¶ 8
(Sept. 23, 1980) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines].
266. Kalhan, supra note 9, at 1136; see also NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., INS DATA: THE
TRACK RECORD (2003).
267. WESTAT CORP., supra note 131; see also MARC R. ROSENBLUM, MIGRATION POLICY
INST., E-VERIFY: STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM (2011); Stumpf, supra note 130, at 399–400.
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GAO analysis of Secure Communities found that ICE had no record of the
criminal arrest charges for more than half of all individuals removed under
the program during 2011 and the first half of 2012; other evidence indicates
that a significant number of individuals are detained and placed into
removal proceedings as a result of the program who ultimately prove not to
be deportable. 268 More recently, over one million immigrant families have
experienced difficulties applying for health care coverage and insurance
subsidies under the Affordable Care Act due to problems with verification
of their immigration or citizenship status. 269
Second, when database systems are made interoperable and accessible
to large numbers of actors, erroneous information can propagate widely and
quickly and can become even more difficult to correct. 270 Outside of
immigration agencies, other databases that are relied upon for immigration
surveillance purposes suffer from similar data quality problems. For
example, despite some recent improvements, criminal history records
databases often remain inaccurate, inconsistent across states, and
incomplete. 271 Improper deprivations of liberty based on inaccurate
information in these database records remain common. 272 Observers also
have documented large numbers of concededly innocent individuals whose
names have been added to watchlists generated by the TSDB, such as the
No Fly List and Selectee List, and inadequate mechanisms exist to remove
names of innocent individuals from those lists. 273
Third, contrary to the connotations suggested by the term “database,”
the use of these systems does not simply involve the retrieval and reliance
268. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-708, SECURE COMMUNITIES: CRIMINAL
ALIEN REMOVALS INCREASED, BUT TECHNOLOGY PLANNING IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED 22–23
(2012).
269. Letter from AFL-CIO, et al., to Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human
Services, Organizational Sign-On Letter to Improve Access to Health Insurance Under the ACA
for Immigrant Families, July 31, 2014, available at http://ccf.georgetown.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2012/04/Advocates-SignOn-Letter-to-Burwell_Immigrant-Barriers-7-29-14.pdf;
see also DINAH WILEY, IMPLEMENTING THE ACA FOR IMMIGRANT FAMILIES: CONSIDERATIONS
AND CHALLENGES (2012); Alex Dobuzinskis & Curtis Skinner, Obamacare Enrollment by Latinos Hurt by Immigration Law Concerns, REUTERS (Dec. 18, 2013), http://reut.rs/1dmy8ee.
270. See JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, INTEROP: THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF HIGHLY
INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS 145 (2012) (noting that with increasing interoperability and connectivity among complex systems, “harm can spread like contagion . . . [without] mechanisms to stop
it.”); LYNCH, supra note 113, at 9.
271. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL
HISTORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 2010, at 2–8 (2011); see James B. Jacobs, Mass Incarceration
and the Proliferation of Criminal Records, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 387, 416–18 (2006).
272. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1512 (2012); Arizona v. Evans,
514 U.S. 1, 27–29 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); United States v. Esquivel-Rios, 725 F.3d
1231 (10th Cir. 2013); see DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND
PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 46–47 (2004); Murphy, supra note 264, at 825.
273. Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 3:06-cv-00545-WHA (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2014);
Shane, supra note 134, at 815–19.
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of “factual” information, whether accurate or otherwise. To the contrary, as
discussed above, much of the information generated by these systems and
relied upon by enforcement actors necessarily incorporates analysis, risk
assessment, and the exercise of subjective and evaluative human judgments
at some stage. Those judgments may have been made directly, such as
when individuals are identified for inclusion in the No Fly List, Selectee
List, or other watchlists, or indirectly, as with the automated risk
assessments made by systems like the ATS and CAPPS, whose evaluations
and predictions are generated using algorithms that invariably embed
human judgments, assumptions, fallibilities, and potential biases. 274
However, in either case, the nature of the data generated and distributed by
government database systems—coupled with the opaque nature of the
criteria for inclusion—can mask the subjective and evaluative judgments
that underlie that information, making it seem more objectively factual to
enforcement actors relying upon it than may be warranted.275
Finally, the biometric identification technologies upon which
immigration surveillance relies are not foolproof. For example, although
automated fingerprint identification systems can be extremely accurate in
determining identity, they nevertheless can yield inaccurate results, owing
to technological limitations, the quality of fingerprint recording processes,
and even the particular demographic groups in which the subjects are
members. 276 Advanced multimodal biometric identification systems that
are currently under development have limitations and fallibilities of their
own. 277
All of these risks, limitations, and concerns might be more tolerable
under circumstances in which database screening processes were merely
one step in a fuller investigative process. Indeed, even if it were
hypothetically possible for database systems and biometric technologies to
be perfectly accurate, consistent, and complete, well-functioning
interoperability processes would still depend on competent and effective
“human and institutional layers.” 278 Officials emphasize that ATS, for
example, “does not replace human decision making” but rather is simply a
“decision support tool” that “assist[s] the border authorities in targeting

274. See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 155, 4–6; Citron, supra note 19, at 1260–63; Bernstein, supra note 262, at 506–07.
275. Bernstein, supra note 262, at 486–88.
276. MAGNET, supra note 120; see also COLE, supra note 22, at 254–58; FROOMKIN &
WEINBERG, supra note 115, at 4, 7.
277. LYNCH, supra note 113, at 10–11; see also GARFINKEL, supra note 115, at 37–67;
MAGNET, supra note 120; Hu, supra note 120, at 1534–41.
278. PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 270, at 39–53; see PATO & MILLETT, supra note 119, at
19; Murphy, supra note 264, at 825.
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scarce inspection resources.” 279 Similarly, when E-Verify generates a
tentative non-confirmation for a would-be employee or ESTA denies a
would-be visitor authorization to travel without a visa, those individuals are
given opportunities to resolve the issue in person before any final denial of
authorization is issued. Over the long term, improvements in data quality
and integrity might help to reduce the percentage of improper deprivations
generated by these systems—as already seen to some extent, for example,
with E-Verify. 280
The nature of immigration surveillance, however, limits the space for
these human and institutional layers to function carefully and effectively—
and given the enormous scale of immigration surveillance activities, even
small error rates can result in very large numbers of individuals facing
improper deprivations that are often left unremedied. While intended to
eliminate improper discrimination, immigration surveillance mechanisms
sometimes merely shift the point at which such discrimination takes place.
With E-Verify, for example, employers often decline to hire individuals
who receive tentative non-confirmations without properly notifying them—
depriving these workers of employment without any opportunity to resolve
errors in database records. 281 Similarly, even as Secure Communities seeks
to preclude police from any direct immigration policing role after
individuals have been arrested, it empowers police to arrest individuals for
the very purpose of booking them and having their immigration status
screened—without regard to whether that arrest leads to any criminal
prosecution. Evidence to date suggests that in some jurisdictions, this is
precisely what has happened. 282 With both of these systems, evidence
suggests that these types of errors and deprivations fall disproportionately
upon particular communities. 283
Moreover, agencies involved in immigration surveillance are typically
subject to limited oversight and deferential (if any) review. Accordingly,
those agencies have few incentives to ensure that the records contained in
their database systems are accurate, complete, and current. In addition,
many of these systems are not governed or meaningfully constrained by any
framework statutes. While the Privacy Act of 1974 requires agencies to
ensure that government records of personal information are accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete, the statute only applies to systems of
279. Paul Rosenzweig, Targeting Terrorists: The Counterrevolution, 34 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 5083, 5087–88 (2008); see Stodder, supra note 130, at 86–88.
280. WESTAT CORP., supra note 131.
281. In some instances, employers also improperly use E-Verify to screen applicants before
they have been hired, and then simply avoid hiring or considering applicants for whom the system
has generated tentative non-confirmations. ROSENBLUM, supra note 267, at 7–8.
282. AARTI KOHLI, PETER L. MARKOWITZ & LISA CHAVEZ, SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE
NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS 6 (2011).
283. Id.; ROSENBLUM, supra note 267, at 7–8; Stumpf, supra note 130, at 400–01.
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records about U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents. 284 Moreover,
even for records on those categories of individuals, the statute permits
agencies to exempt records concerning law enforcement or national security
from its coverage. 285
While some individuals have filed lawsuits
challenging their improper inclusion in these database systems, the lack of
transparency concerning the criteria and operations of these systems makes
those legal challenges difficult. 286 While more accurate database systems
would better serve these agencies’ own interests, the incentives for
immigration control, law enforcement, and national security agencies to
devote the resources necessary to ensure the accuracy and integrity of these
databases on their own, without external oversight, are limited.287
In short, the combination of database errors, automation-related biases,
complex but time-pressured decisionmaking, massive volumes of
identification and screening activities, fragmented responsibilities among
different authorities, and laws and agency incentives that are misaligned
with the goal of ensuring data accuracy and integrity can easily result in
large numbers of improper denials of immigration-related authorizations in
a variety of different contexts. In many instances, these deprivations fall
disproportionately on particular groups. 288 Especially given the lack of
transparency and oversight mechanisms in these systems, the limited
procedural protections and access to counsel afforded to noncitizens at all
stages of the migration process, and the limited protections for U.S. citizens
who are outside the United States or seeking to enter, the consequences of
these fallibilities can be significant and difficult to remedy.
C. Data Collection, Retention, and Secondary Use
Quite apart from the accuracy and integrity of data in these systems,
immigration surveillance raises the problem of “function creep”: the
gradual and sometimes imperceptible expansion of surveillance
mechanisms, once in place, for secondary uses beyond those originally

284. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)–(w) (2013).
285. Bernstein, supra note 262, at 467–69, 504–06; Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in
the Criminal Justice System: Information Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law
Enforcement Exemptions, 111 MICH. L. REV. 485, 487 (2013).
286. Latif v. Holder, 686 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2012); Latif v. Holder, No.-10-Civ.-750, 2014
WL 2871346 (D. Or. June 24, 2014); Mohamed v. Holder, 995 F.Supp.2d 520 (E.D. Va. 2014);
Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No.-06-civ.-545 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2014), ECF No. 682,
available at http://klhn.co/Ibrahim-NDCal-ECF-682; see also First Amended Complaint, Makowski v. Holder, No. 12 Civ. 5265 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 2012), ECF No. 45, available at
http://klhn.co/Makowski-NDIll-ECF-45.
287. Bernstein, supra note 262, at 471–73.
288. KOHLI ET AL., supra note 282; cf. Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Flying While Brown: Federal Civil Rights Remedies to Post-9/11 Airline Racial Profiling of South Asians, 10 ASIAN L.J. 215
(2003).
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intended or contemplated.289 Fair information principles urge limits on the
secondary use of information for purposes not specified when collected. 290
However, a lengthy list of examples demonstrates that such constraints are
often lacking in the first place or difficult to maintain: the proliferation of
surveillance camera systems to police a widening array of low level
offenses, 291 the expanding use of online tracking, 292 the use of census data
and voter lists to facilitate targeting of disfavored individuals or groups, 293
the expansion of DNA databases maintained by law enforcement to
encompass rapidly widening categories of individuals and purposes, 294 and
the repurposing of various categories of identity documents and
identification systems. 295
Surveillance practices undertaken in the
aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks have routinely morphed beyond the
scope of their original antiterrorism purposes. For example, the “fusion
centers” established during the past decade to collect, analyze, and
exchange terrorism-related intelligence information among law enforcement
agencies almost immediately, and unapologetically, expanded the scope of
their activities to encompass ordinary crimes. 296
By virtue of the enormous quantities of information that they collect,
store, and disseminate—and the rapidly increasing ability to access and
share that information among different public and private entities—the
systems that comprise the surveillance infrastructure of immigration
surveillance are particularly susceptible to secondary uses and function

289. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 210 (2006) (“Systems of surveillance are
instituted for one reason; they get used for another.”); see Richard V. Ericson & Kevin D. Haggerty, The New Politics of Surveillance and Visibility, in THE NEW POLITICS OF SURVEILLANCE AND
VISIBILITY 3, 18–19 (Richard V. Ericson & Kevin D. Haggerty eds., 2006); Gary T. Marx, Seeing
Hazily (But Not Darkly) Through the Lens: Some Recent Empirical Studies of Surveillance Technologies, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 339, 385–87 (2005).
290. OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 265, ¶¶ 9–10; Solove, supra note 112, at 520–22.
291. William Webster, CCTV Policy in the UK: Reconsidering the Evidence Base, 6
SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 10 (2009).
292. GILLIOM & MONAHAN, supra note 4, at 55–63.
293. David Lyon, Identification, Surveillance and Democracy, in SURVEILLANCE AND
DEMOCRACY 34 (Kevin D. Haggerty & Minas Samatas eds., 2010); William Seltzer & Margo
Anderson, The Dark Side of Numbers: The Role of Population Data Systems in Human Rights
Abuses, 68 SOC. RES. 481 (2001).
294. Barry Steinhardt, Privacy and Forensic DNA Data Banks, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE 173, 174–75 (David Lazer ed., 2004); Joseph
Goldstein, Police Agencies Are Assembling Records of DNA, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 13, 2013, at A1.
295. LYON, supra note 4; see also WENDY R. WEISER, JUSTIN LEVITT, CATHERINE WEISS, &
SPENCER OVERTON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, RESPONSE TO THE REPORT OF THE 2005
COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM (2005) (criticizing proposal to expand use of biometric drivers’ licenses and ID cards required by REAL ID Act as a mandatory form of voter
identification); Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1402 (2001).
296. Monahan & Regan, supra note 157, at 303; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 155, at 1463–
64.
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creep. The deployment of immigration surveillance systems and processes
has taken place with very few constraints or limitations. Data retention
periods for the biometric, biographic, and other personal information in
identification systems, travel and mobility control systems, and other
databases used for immigration enforcement purposes are exceptionally
long, and few limits constrain routine sharing of information among
different agencies.
Moreover, as the cost of storing information continues to decrease and
the technological capabilities of these systems continue to improve, the
number of possible secondary uses for these systems will increase even
further—particularly given the premium placed on unconstrained
information sharing. 297 For example, the most recent enhancements to the
FBI’s identification systems enable collection and storage of unparalleled
quantities of biometric and biographic information from a variety of
different sources, including multimodal biometric records of fingerprints,
multiple photographs, iris scans, palm prints, voice data, and potentially
other biometric identifiers along with detailed biographical information.
Those systems also will be made fully interoperable with the other
identification systems maintained by DHS and the Defense Department that
comprise the “biometrics triad,” as discussed above.298 In connection with
these enhancements, immigration authorities have begun to deploy systems
in pilot programs that permit the identification of individuals without any
need to review identification documents, using facial recognition and iris
recognition technologies that compare biometrics captured in the field with
information stored in multiple federal and state government databases. 299
Some of these systems also may enable remote identification of individuals
without the need to be in their immediate physical proximity. 300 Officials

297. Kevin S. Bankston & Ashkan Soltani, Tiny Constables and the Cost of Surveillance:
Making Cents Out of United States v. Jones, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 335 (2014); see United States
v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Technological progress poses a threat to privacy by
enabling an extent of surveillance that in earlier times would have been prohibitively expensive.”).
298. What Facial Recognition Technology Means for Privacy and Civil Liberties: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Privacy, Technology, and the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
112th Cong., 102–06 (2012) (written statement of Jennifer Lynch, Electronic Frontier Foundation), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2134497; Aliya Sternstein, Feds Significantly Expand
the Use of Iris-Recognition Technology, NEXTGOV (July 13, 2012), http://shar.es/Q7y32; see supra notes 159–161 and accompanying text.
299. See Donohue, supra note 117, at 440–51; Ali Winston, Facial Recognition, Once a Battlefield Tool, Lands in San Diego County, CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Nov. 7, 2013),
http://cironline.org/reports/facial-recognition-once-battlefield-tool-lands-san-diego-county-5502.
300. Jacob Goodwin, Iris Recognition Is Being Tested on Illegal Immigrants in McAllen, TX,
GOV’T SEC. NEWS (Aug. 31, 2012), http://www.gsnmagazine.com/node/27136; Ginger McCall,
The Face Scan Arrives, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2013, at A19; Jennifer Lynch & Dave Maass, San
Diego Gets in Your Face With New Mobile Identification System, EFF DEEPLINKS (Nov. 7, 2013),
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/san-diego-gets-your-face-new-mobile-identificationsystem.
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also have piloted programs to collect other kinds of biometrics, including
DNA from refugees in Africa seeking admission to the United States and
noncitizens in immigration detention.301
With database systems becoming increasingly sophisticated and
interoperable, the pressures for expanded use of the information stored in
these systems will continue to mount. At the same time, with few
limitations inhibiting them from doing so, immigration authorities might
well seek even greater access to database systems maintained and held by
federal, state, local, and even private entities for immigration control
purposes. However, even as the prospect of ever-widening uses of these
systems highlights the importance of addressing those possibilities before
particular surveillance mechanisms are widely implemented, the ability to
do so can be elusive—particularly when those mechanisms have been
deployed rapidly, with minimal transparency, under vague legal authority,
and subject to limited external constraints.302
V. CONSTRAINING THE IMMIGRATION SURVEILLANCE STATE
With the technologies and processes of the immigration surveillance
state becoming a more durable part of the landscape of immigration
regulation, much greater attention needs to be given to principles and
mechanisms to constrain, inform, and guide their implementation and help
limit the reach of the immigration surveillance state. 303 In this Part, I
identify and advance these principles and mechanisms. My objective in this
Part is not to present a detailed catalog of specific policy recommendations
for the many different domains in which immigration surveillance activities
now take place. Instead, I aim to highlight principles and approaches, in
more general terms, that should be considered across all of these many domains, leaving specific prescriptions about particular initiatives for future
work. First, I analyze the traditionally undervalued individual and social
interests at stake in the collection, processing, and dissemination of detailed
personal information for migration and mobility control purposes. Second,
I argue against the persistence of border and immigration exceptionalism,
which often results in a degree of deference to immigration surveillance
activities that is excessive in relation to those interests. Finally, I highlight
301. LYNCH, supra note 113, at 7–8.
302. See Ericson & Haggerty, supra note 289, at 18–19 (arguing that function creep is “notoriously difficult to transform into a coherent and successful stakeholder politics”); Marx, supra
note 285, at 387 (“Asking questions about the process of surveillance creep and possible latent
goals should be a central part of any public policy discussion of surveillance before it is introduced.”).
303. See BUSH & BOLICK, supra note 219, at 54–56 (urging expanded use of surveillance
technologies in immigration enforcement, but also advocating “measures protecting individual
privacy, requiring immediate correction of false identifications, and setting forth procedures for
obtaining and using biometric data”).
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the importance of improving transparency, oversight, and accountability
mechanisms when implementing these initiatives.
A. Protecting Information Interests in Migration, Mobility, and Travel
Immigration surveillance demands reassessment of the interests at
stake when personal information and travel history are collected,
maintained, analyzed, and disseminated for purposes related to immigration
control and the mechanisms to protect those interests.304 The proliferation
of zones where immigration control activities take place—and where
detailed information on individuals and their migration and mobility
histories is collected and subsequently aggregated, stored, and
disseminated—carries a range of social costs.305 While it is entirely
appropriate to collect, maintain, and disseminate personal information for
immigration control purposes in some contexts and subject to certain
constraints, both individuals and society as a whole have legitimate interests
in preserving zones in which these immigration surveillance activities do
not take place and in making sure that when they do take place those
activities are appropriately limited and constrained.
To some extent, those interests are individual interests, stemming from
the value of preserving individual anonymity or quasi-anonymity more
generally and the individual harms that can result when individuals’
migration and mobility are routinely tracked and detailed information is
maintained. 306 But they also arise from a broader set of social concerns that
surveillance and information privacy scholars have increasingly recognized
as important. These social interests—for example, preventing coercive or
excessive aggregations of unrestrained government power—often have less
to do with the particular information being collected in any given instance
than with the harms that can arise from the means of surveillance and
information management. 307 In recent decisions, the Supreme Court has

304. See Solove, supra note 112, at 490–91 (proposing typology of privacy-related problems
arising from the collection, storage, analysis, usage, and dissemination of information from data
subjects).
305. Kalhan, supra note 1; see Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age:
The Problem of Privacy in Public, 17 LAW & PHIL. 559, 591–93 (1998).
306. See Helen Nissenbaum, The Meaning of Anonymity in an Information Age, 15 INFO.
SOC’Y 141, 144 (2006); A. Michael Froomkin, Legal Issues in Anonymity and Pseudonymity, 15
INFO. SOC’Y 113, 115–16 (1999).
307. Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
3, ¶¶ 58–70; David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV.
62 (2013); SOLOVE, supra note 272, at 93–101; Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in Public, 69 U.
MIAMI L. REV.
(forthcoming
2014)
(manuscript
at
9–13),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2493449; Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94
GEO. L.J. 1087, 1099–1100 (2006); Paul M. Schwartz & William M. Treanor, The New Privacy,
101 MICH. L. REV. 2163, 2177 (2003).
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signaled a willingness to give greater weight to these kinds of interests than
they have traditionally received. 308
Vindicating these interests in the context of immigration surveillance
therefore requires context-appropriate constraints on the collection, use,
storage, and dissemination of personal information for immigration
enforcement purposes—including robust limits on retention periods and
secondary uses of information that were not originally contemplated. To
date, however, exuberance over the potential benefits of interoperable
databases and other new technologies has clouded attention to the continued
importance of these limits when implementing these systems for migration
and mobility control purposes. In an era in which more data is almost
always assumed to be better, more information sharing and
interconnectivity between database systems is also often assumed to be
better as well. 309 But as John Palfrey and Urs Gasser have emphasized,
“complete interoperability at all times and in all places . . . can introduce
new vulnerabilities” and “exacerbate existing problems.” Accordingly, they
argue, placing constraints upon information sharing and interoperability and
retaining “friction in [the] system” may often be more optimal.310
B. Ending Border and Immigration Exceptionalism
Immigration surveillance sits at the intersection of several different
doctrines that afford significant deference to government actors in border,
migration, and mobility control. Under its border enforcement
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has afforded federal officials
considerable latitude to conduct immigration and customs enforcement
activities. This deference is strongest at the physical border itself, where
the Court has deemed “routine,” suspicionless searches and seizures of
individuals and property for purposes of enforcing immigration and
customs laws to be per se reasonable, and therefore exempt from the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant and probable cause requirements, “simply by virtue
of the fact that they occur at the border.” 311 The Court has reached this
conclusion with little explanation, often relying on conclusory statements or
invocations of history and tradition with little more. 312 In some instances,
the Court has explicitly invoked and tied this “border exception” to the
federal government’s power over immigration, which it has long deemed to
308. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954
(2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id at 957 (Alito, J., concurring).
309. Citron & Gray, supra note 223, at 262.
310. PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 270, at 75–76.
311. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977).
312. See Paul Rosenzweig, Comment, Functional Equivalents of the Border, Sovereignty, and
the Fourth Amendment, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1123 (1985) (“Although susceptible to criticism,
this historical justification has become the Court’s standard reply to challenges to the border
search exception.”).
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be plenary. In others, the Court has instead characterized border searches as
falling within the categories of exceptions from ordinary Fourth
Amendment limits for administrative or “special needs” searches.313
In a world in which the migration border is effectively everywhere,
policed by large numbers of actors other than federal immigration
officials—and in which immigration surveillance activities reach large
numbers of U.S. citizens and noncitizens with lawful immigration status—
the justifications for such sweeping deference become more difficult to
maintain. The categories of potential deprivations that can result from
immigration surveillance activities have multiplied drastically beyond the
simple ability to enter and remain in the United States. With the expansion
of the domains of enforcement and the tools of immigration surveillance,
these enforcement activities can place restrictions on the rights to
international and domestic travel, employment, education, social service
benefits, and freedom from physical restraint in both the criminal justice
and immigration enforcement processes. As discussed above, the powerful
tools of immigration surveillance create significant risks of erroneous
deprivations and are easily susceptible for uses beyond those originally
contemplated when implemented.
Courts have slowly begun to recognize that significant interests are at
stake in immigration surveillance activities for both noncitizens and U.S.
citizens. 314 However, these interests have continued to be given insufficient
weight by Congress, which has exempted records of most noncitizens from
the Privacy Act, and the executive branch, which has invoked the Act’s
exemptions from its coverage for databases used for law enforcement and
national security purposes. Narrowing these exemptions in the Act’s
coverage would enable these interests to be given the weight that they
deserve, and ensure that any countervailing government interests are
recognized and given effect only when supported by reasoned justifications.
C. Transparency, Oversight, and Due Process
Finally, immigration surveillance demands greater attention to
transparency, oversight, and accountability. Whether programmatically or

313. Compare Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973) (citing Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603–04 (1889)) with United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,
473 U.S. 531, 538–40 (1985); see Kalhan, supra note 1, at 1190–1205.
314. See Latif v. Holder, 686 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2012); Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
669 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2012); American Academy of Religion v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 115 (2d
Cir. 2009); Latif v. Holder, No. 10 Civ. 750, 2014 WL 2871346 (D.Or. June 24, 2014); Ibrahim v.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 06 Civ. 545 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2014), ECF No. 682 (findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and order for relief), available at http://klhn.co/Ibrahim-NDCal-ECF682; Mohamed v. Holder, 995 F.Supp.2d 520 (E.D. Va. 2014); see also First Amended Complaint, Makowski v. Holder, No. 12 Civ. 5265 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 2012), ECF No. 45, available at
http://klhn.co/Makowski-NDIll-ECF-45.
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in the context of individual adjudications, immigration agencies, although
improving in some ways, have long suffered from major transparency and
accountability deficits.315 Those deficits are amply evident in immigration
surveillance initiatives and have been exacerbated by the blurred lines
created by the deterritorialized migration border. Ensuring greater
transparency, oversight, and due process requires responses at a number of
different levels.
First, a major contributing factor to the lack of sufficient transparency,
oversight, and accountability has been the lack of sufficiently concrete or
detailed legal authority to support and guide such major and complicated
initiatives. No framework statutes govern or constrain immigration
surveillance activities, which, as discussed above, also fall outside of the
limited privacy protections available under the Privacy Act. This lack of a
statutory framework governing surveillance activities that implicate privacy
interests in migration, mobility, and travel data stands in marked contrast to
other areas, such as communications and financial services, in which
government access, storage, and dissemination of personal information
have long been governed and constrained by framework statutes.316
Whether coming from Congress, the executive branch, or both acting
together, accountability and oversight of immigration surveillance would be
better served by a more detailed, coherent legal framework governing
immigration surveillance activities and opportunities for greater public
engagement with those rules. As the Markle Foundation has emphasized,
new national security information sharing initiatives demand privacy and
security protections that “address the hard questions [such as secondary use
and redress] . . . as opposed to existing policies that state that agencies must
comply with the law without providing guidance on how to do so.” 317
These observations hold true across the full range of initiatives in which
immigration surveillance activities take place and will only become more
315. Chacón, supra note 7; Sklansky, supra note 7, at 212–21; Serena Hoy, The Other Detainees, LEGAL AFF., Sept.–Oct. 2004, at 58; Andrew Becker, Ousted Chief Accuses Border Agency of
Shooting Cover-Ups, Corruption, CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Aug. 14, 2014),
http://beta.cironline.org/reports/ousted-chief-accuses-border-agency-of-shooting-cover-upscorruption.
316. E.g., Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108
Stat. 4279 (1994); Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, Title XI, 92 Stat.
3641, 3697–3710 (1978); see Hasbrouck, supra note 148, at 4; Kalhan, supra note 1, at 1210–11.
While critics have questioned the adequacy of some of these statutory constraints, no comparable
statutory framework governs or constrains most immigration surveillance activities to any meaningful extent.
317. ZOE BAIRD BUDINGER & JEFFREY H. SMITH, MARKLE FOUND., TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11:
A STATUS REPORT ON INFORMATION SHARING 7 (2011) (urging the federal government also to
“find ways to publically discuss the legal authorities associated with data collection, sharing, and
use . . . in order to ensure public trust in the policies and adequate oversight”); see Balkin, supra
note 4, at 21; Joel R. Reidenberg, The Data Surveillance State in the United States and Europe, 49
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 583, 606–08 (2014).
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relevant as authorities continue to incorporate, upgrade, and integrate
technology-based surveillance mechanisms in other aspects of immigration
governance.
Second, individual opportunities to redress harms arising from
immigration surveillance activities, whether administrative or judicial in
nature, can still play an important role—not only in remedying those
individual harms, but also in creating incentives for DHS and other actors to
ensure that information maintained in their database systems is accurate and
complete. 318 Current redress mechanisms, however, do not give sufficient
opportunities for individuals to remedy improper deprivations. While
courts have begun to fill this gap, more robust and regularized redress
mechanisms at the administrative level would create additional incentives
for the authorities involved in immigration control to ensure the accuracy
and integrity of their data.
Finally, immigration surveillance demands more attention to forms of
structural oversight. Because of the necessarily opaque manner in which
database systems and automated decisionmaking mechanisms often
function—and the ways in which multiple actors are involved in their
operation over extended periods of time—oversight of these systems can be
particularly difficult in the context of individual cases.319 This is
undoubtedly more true in the immigration enforcement system, which has
traditionally been ill-equipped to supervise investigatory practices. 320
Given the limitations in the ability of individual redress mechanisms to
fully ensure proper oversight of database systems, these systems raise the
stakes in making sure that structural oversight mechanisms operate
effectively. 321 Especially as immigration surveillance integrates the
institutions of immigration control with each other and with the institutions
of other domains, the blurred lines of accountability among different
institutions make accountability difficult; the implementation of automated
immigration surveillance initiatives only blurs those lines further.322

318. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 148–57 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting);
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
319. Murphy, supra note 264, at 826–29, 831–32; see Frank Pasquale, Restoring Transparency to Automated Authority, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 235, 235–39, 250–54 (2011).
320. See Chacón, supra note 77, at 1603–19.
321. See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 155, at 1470–93 (proposing mechanisms of “network
accountability” as means of ensuring proper oversight of fusion centers); Murphy, supra note 264,
at 826–29 (emphasizing importance of “structural oversight” to ensure the integrity and proper use
of database systems); see also Bernstein, supra note 262; Anjali Dalal, Shadow Administrative
Constitutionalism and the Creation of Surveillance Culture, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 59, 118–36.
322. Sklansky, supra note 7, at 212–21.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Technology, as Erin Murphy has explained, “alters—rather than just
mechanizes—the relationship between the individual and the state.”323
With the introduction of new surveillance and dataveillance technologies,
the traditional relationships between individuals and the institutions of
immigration control are being reconfigured in fundamental ways for both
noncitizens and U.S. citizens alike. And yet, compared to other aspects of
the expansion of immigration enforcement, these shifts in migration and
mobility surveillance have garnered exceedingly little attention, analysis, or
concern—even as vigorous debates about surveillance and dataveillance by
public and private institutions have emerged in other settings.
These shifts have not simply contributed to a regime of mass
enforcement, in which hundreds of thousands of noncitizens have faced
detention and deportation. More fundamentally, the evolution of
immigration enforcement institutions, practices, and meanings has also
contributed to a more basic transformation of the nature of immigration
governance—with implications for noncitizens and U.S. citizens alike. By
recounting and analyzing this transformation and its consequences, this
Article highlights the need for scholars, advocates, policymakers, and other
observers to devote greater attention and scrutiny to the onset of the
immigration surveillance state and its rapid integration into the broader
national surveillance state.

323. Murphy, supra note 16, at 145.

